

WHEN THE LOSERS WRITE HISTORY: THE STORY OF BARCELONA
UNDER SIEGE IN THE FINAL YEAR OF THE
SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1938-1939)

by

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ABSTRACT

Barcelona's most prominent newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, framed a fierce resistance to Franco during the Spanish Civil War even when it became clear that defeat was imminent. Its writers and editors made a desperate plea for democratic values, not just to struggling locals or the international community they still sought to recruit, but to future generations. These journalists thus proved uniquely discerning of the implications of their work, appearing to recognize outright that they had lost the war in the hope that their legacy might one day be recovered. In a striking break with the past, *La Vanguardia* designated itself the "guardian of democracy" and argued for the newfound rights of women, minorities, and workers. This thesis examines the rise and fall of the Second Spanish Republic, the ideals stirred up in revolutionary Barcelona, and the significant role assumed by the media in wartime.

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PREFACE

In introducing this thesis, I find myself echoing the words of the Spanish lawyer and political historian Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo: “I, a sinner, confess to my readers—should I be so lucky to have them—the grave sin of audacity, for daring to attempt the study of the evolution of Catalan thought in its political-regional aspect, so as to contribute to the examination of the contemporary Catalanist movement.”¹ Yet I, like Ossorio before me, also believe that ambitious projects tend to be the most worthwhile. Ossorio sought to understand the discord of his time, to get to the root of the chaotic nationalism storming Barcelona. In my case, it began as an overwhelming quest to uncover just a little bit more of the culture of a bygone era.

I first became interested in the Spanish Civil War when I learned of my great uncle’s involvement in the International Brigades. Milton, as he called himself, was a promising student with a scholarship to the University of Chicago Medical School who gave up everything to fight for Spanish democracy. Records show that he arrived in Spain in 1937. He died in the Battle of the Ebro in November 1938 at twenty-four years of age.

As a student of Spanish language and culture at Smith College, I spent time in Salamanca, Córdoba, and Barcelona. Though nearly all Spanish cities bear the scars of the Civil War, Barcelona is an exceptional case. Bullet holes still mark the façades of

¹ Ángel Ossorio, *Historia del pensamiento político catalán durante la guerra de España con la República Francesa, 1793-1795* (Madrid: 1913), 7.

Barcelona's most prominent churches and ministerial buildings, numerous monuments stand to honor the dead, and the elderly, when prompted enough, will quietly tell you the harrowing tales of the childhood they lost to violence, poverty, and starvation. This experience ignited in me a passion for the multicultural city that seemed always to be in contention with the rest of Spain. Was it Spanish or Catalan? Should it proclaim itself the capital of an independent state or remain at the center of Spanish commerce? Even a detailed study of its history, as Ossorio discovered, offers no decisive answer.

When digging through the primary sources, I became so fascinated by their style and content that I took it upon myself to provide English-language translations of the Spanish text. My advanced training in literary translation at the University of Edinburgh prepared me for this endeavor, as quality translation requires more than linguistic fluency. Though sometimes treated as mechanical and straightforward, translation demands an enormous amount of tact, creativity, and problem-solving in the attempt to reconcile the conflicting perceptions and values of different cultures and communities. At its core, translation involves the crossing of the supposedly insuperable barriers of language and culture and the forging of a deeper personal connection among nations around the globe. Unless stated otherwise, all Spanish translations presented here are my own work.

My research has taken me from *La Vanguardia*'s online database to the General Archive of the Spanish Civil War in Salamanca, Spain. I will never forget sorting through documents in the bitter January cold or the help of the senior archivist who never let me out of his sight. I never could have completed this thesis without the guidance of my advisor Dr. Kimberley Mangun, my committee members Dr. Kevin Coe and Dr. Robin Jensen, or the support of my friends and family. I owe a special thanks to Professors Miriam and

Sonia Albert Sobrino (better known as ALSO Sisters), to Micah Neiman, Saba Rebecca Brause, and Michelle Anjirbag, and to my parents, for their endless patience and encouragement.

It is my hope that this master's thesis will provide readers with knowledge and understanding of a subject to which I have dedicated my academic career. To call upon Ossorio once more: "What is the purpose of demonstrating such inadequacy? For whose benefit do I undertake this venture? I will explain the incongruity. May the quality of my argument make up for my mistakes."²

² The original words are as follows (I altered them slightly in my preface): "¿Quién le mete A V. en la aventura? ¿Para qué se empeña en exhibir su insuficiencia? ¿A beneficio de quién acomete V. un trabajo tan evidentemente superior a sus elementos de acción? Trataré de explicar la incongruencia. Y quiera Dios que la calidad de mis razones sirva de perdón a mis yerros." See Ángel Ossorio, *Historia del pensamiento político catalán durante la guerra de España con la República Francesa, 1793-1795* (Madrid: 1913), 7-8.

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Barcelona stood on the verge of collapse. Fascist planes bombed the city, reducing entire neighborhoods to rubble, while hordes of soldiers prepared for the final assault. Thousands of refugees fled the Catalan capital for France, a border most of them would never reach. Within twenty-four hours, Francisco Franco's forces would overtake Barcelona and declare an end to the brutal campaign known as the "Catalan offensive."³ It was January 25, 1939, Barcelona's last day as part of the Second Spanish Republic, but the journalists of *La Vanguardia* refused to desert its cause, continuing to voice fierce ideological resistance even when defeat proved imminent. They wrote:

Our words do not affect the government as regards the outcome of this war. This outcome remains inevitable. We cannot lose the war, because that would mean to lose democracy her greatest bastion, her most ardent breath...Our dead command us to resist. To stop the invaders in their tracks. To scream anew: They shall not pass!...But it depends, not so much on the government as on the bravery of our soldiers and the support of our citizens, to ensure that all goes according to plan! We are not defying the Fates, who change at times, because, in the case of Spain's independence, the Fates cannot be different from what they always were, for the love of our people I invoke their honorable qualities. Our enemy must hurry, but destiny need never hurry.⁴

³ Helen Graham, *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 102.

⁴ *La Vanguardia*, January 25, 1939.

Barcelona's biggest newspaper thus framed its ultimate resistance to autocracy in the form of a desperate plea—not just to struggling locals or the international community it still sought to recruit, but to future generations. In this way, *La Vanguardia*'s journalists proved uniquely discerning of the implications of their work, appearing to recognize outright that they had lost the war while hoping that their legacy might one day be recovered. Since Francisco Franco's death in 1975, Spaniards have slowly begun to come to terms with their traumatic past and restore the democracy they first attempted in 1931. Historians have conducted intensive research into the communist and fascist propaganda of the time, the role and organization of the famed International Brigades, and the roots of the conflict itself, yet few have investigated the style or content of contemporary coverage, not even in the nation's most prominent periodicals.⁵

The concept of resistance, its framing and design, remains a topic of interest across numerous academic disciplines, including history, political science, and communication, among others, yet researchers tend to focus on it only in its moments of triumph, that is, the French Resistance in World War II, the American and Russian Revolutions, the independence wars of colonized nations. However, in neglecting the resistance movements of unsuccessful causes, scholars miss an important piece of history with the potential to reveal deeper truths concerning media's key role in the narration of conflict, the protection

⁵ Michael Seidman, "Spanish Social Idealism: The Ideological Art of the Revolution in Barcelona (1936-38)," *Mediterranean Studies* 2 (1990): 113-127; Michael Seidman, "Work and Revolution: Workers' Control in Barcelona in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-38," *Journal of Contemporary History* 17.3 (1982): 409-433; Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, "Dictatorship from Below: Local Politics in the Making of the Francoist State, 1937-1948," *The Journal of Modern History* 71.4 (1999): 882-901; Miriam Basilio, "Genealogies for a New State: Painting and Propaganda in Franco's Spain, 1936-1940," *Discourse* 24.3 (2002): 67-94; Stanley G. Payne, "Spanish Fascism," *Salmagundi* 76/77 (1987): 101-12.

and/or promotion of political ideologies, and the construction and reconstruction of cultural memory in divided nations. Barcelona, an example of such “resistance” (and considered the heart of Republican fervor), can only be understood through the development of the “historical imagination” in which its cultural history is taken into account.⁶

La Vanguardia, Catalonia’s leading newspaper that also boasts the fourth highest readership in Spain, has had a long and tumultuous history since it first appeared in print in 1881.⁷ Its dissemination of liberal ideas until the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War rendered it a point of contention in conservative circles dominating early modern Spanish society.⁸ Literally translated as “The Vanguard” in English, this iconic title aptly describes its fierce resistance to autocracy and the rise of fascism in the 1930s. It worked tirelessly throughout the war as a staunch defender of democracy, publishing six days a week in order to invigorate and inform the population. Furthermore, it did so under the direction of María Luz Morales Godoy, the first woman ever to head a Spanish newspaper.⁹

Ultimately “reprogrammed” to endorse the Falangist regime (during which time it was renamed *La Vanguardia Española*), *La Vanguardia* has since returned to its liberal

⁶ James W. Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History,” *Journalism History* (Spring 1974): 4-5.

⁷ A. Nieto Tamargo, *La Empresa Periodística en España* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S. A, 1973), 72, 145.

⁸ Grupo Godó, *La Vanguardia: Historia* (Barcelona: Grupo Godó, 2013). www.grupogodo.net/institucional/historia/.

⁹ Teresa Amiguet, “María Luz Morales, el periodismo tiene nombre de mujer,” *La Vanguardia*, September 22, 2015. www.lavanguardia.com/hemeroteca/20150922/54435276929/maria-luz-morales-periodismo-mujeres-espana-directoras-la-vanguardia-prensa-historia-franquismo-cine.html; *La Vanguardia*, August 7, 1936.

roots and is now recognized for its pioneering journalism, innovative practices, and for being “the oldest, continuously published paper in the country.”¹⁰ This historic status makes it a compelling resource, yet it appears few scholars have studied its wartime communication strategies aside from a cursory look at the major events it reported. Among Barcelona’s most prominent periodicals of the period, such strategies merit analysis as they help to illuminate the role popular media might play in the advancement and preservation of political discourses of the past.

The press was (and still is) believed to hold significant sway over the views and daily lives of its readers. The public of the 1930s relied heavily upon the printed press as the main source of news, rendering periodicals like *La Vanguardia* to be particularly valuable sources of information.¹¹ Moreover, *La Vanguardia* is especially relevant as it was connected to the Juan Negrín government, the official regime of the Second Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War.¹²

This research builds upon recent studies of the Spanish Civil War, its significance and present implications, the unique positionality of Barcelona in the conflict, and the ongoing dialogue of what constitutes Spanish national identity. For centuries, Spain has struggled to define itself, fighting a number of vicious battles in the process, from the Arab invasions of 711 to the final *Reconquista* of 1492 to the Catalan Revolts of the 1640s to

¹⁰ John A. Crow, *Spain, the Root and the Flower: An Interpretation of Spain and the Spanish People* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 411.

¹¹ O. W. Riegel, “Press, Radio, and the Spanish Civil War,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 1.1 (1937): 131-36.

¹² Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 271.

the present-day secessionist movements of Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country, to name but a few.¹³ Today, the Spanish Civil War may be dismissed as “ancient history” by the masses, but its memory lives on in the country’s cultural, artistic, political, and legal institutions, unfailingly stirring up debate and controversy whenever mentioned. In some ways, Spain’s troubled economy, political unrest, and renewed nationalist sentiments recall the early twentieth century, perhaps serving as a disquieting reminder that the matters which lay at the heart of the conflict were never fully resolved. As Arturo Pérez Reverte, elected member of the Real Academia Española (RAE), Spain’s official royal commission for the oversight of Spanish language, stated in one interview: “La Guerra Civil está resuelta, lo que no está resuelto es España” [The Civil War has been resolved, what hasn’t been resolved is Spain].¹⁴ Additionally, my research contributes to the study of wartime journalism as performed by those regions immediately impacted by violence, an aspect often overlooked in favor of foreign correspondence in international reporting.

This chapter outlines the historical context of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Western tradition of wartime journalism, and a description of the theory and methodology utilized to conduct my investigation. This thesis considers three research questions via framing analysis: (1) What were the primary frames crafted by *La*

¹³ J. N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 628; J. H. Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans, a Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598-1640* (Cambridge: University Press, 1963); Laura Desfor Edles, “A Culturalist Approach to Ethnic Nationalist Movements: Symbolization and Basque and Catalan Nationalism in Spain,” *Social Science History* 23.3 (1999): 311-355.

¹⁴ Arturo Pérez Reverte, “La Guerra Civil está resuelta, lo que no está resuelto es España,” *Vozpópuli*, (November 2015). http://www.vozpopuli.com/cultura/Culturas-Guerra_Civil-Literatura-Arturo_Perez-Reverte-Espana-Transiciones-Cultura-Libros_0_863913641.html.

Vanguardia in its coverage of the final year of the Spanish Civil War in 1938-1939 and how did they evolve? (2) What do these frames suggest about the political discourse of the era and (3) What do they reveal about the potential role of mainstream media in times of conflict in democratic societies?

Historical Context: A Brief Overview of the Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War, today recognized as Spain's most devastating conflict, was a long time in the making.¹⁵ Though historians generally refer back to the advent of the Second Spanish Republic (1931) as its precursor, its beginnings may be traced back to the early nineteenth century. Spain's crumbling economy, the loss of her overseas colonies, and the deteriorating conditions of the working class prompted a great deal of civil unrest.¹⁶ Additionally, the liberal ideals proclaimed in the French Revolution had taken hold of Europe, not to be crushed or even contained by the prodigious efforts of the Congress of Vienna.

Spanish insurgents attempted to implement lasting constitutions in the brief interludes between increasingly unstable monarchies, first in 1812 and again in 1874, but their attempts proved ultimately unsuccessful. By the 1920s, Spain had fallen into such corruption and chaos that Miguel Primo de Rivera, an aristocrat and Captain General of the Military backed by King Alfonso XIII, overthrew the government and declared himself Prime Minister. Though he quickly implemented a number of effective reforms, among

¹⁵ P. F. Crespo, "Las mujeres durante la guerra civil," *Historia de las mujeres en España*, Ed. Elisa Garrido González (Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 1997), 515.

¹⁶ B. Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 3.

them the construction of the Barcelona Metro and the expansion of electric power to rural regions, his policies failed to redress the country's worsening economic hardships. By January 1930, he found he had lost so much support, including that of both the King and the Military (formerly his greatest strength), that he resigned from office. His exit coincided with the declaration of the Second Spanish Republic the next year, ushering in a new and democratic era.¹⁷

The first municipal elections were held in April of 1931 followed by elections of the Constituent Assembly in June, the latter of which was endowed with the responsibility of drafting a modern and Republican constitution for all Spain. Radical for its time, this new constitution implemented numerous progressive changes, including women's suffrage, laws allowing for divorce, universal education, the disestablishment of the Jesuit Order, and the nullification of state privileges traditionally held by the Roman Catholic Church. Its administration promoted policies hostile to the monarchy and religious institutions, prompting Alfonso XIII to flee the country in exile just two days after the official inauguration of the Second Spanish Republic.¹⁸

Many scholars have speculated as to what led to the Republic's decline, citing the

¹⁷ Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, "The Failure of the Liberal Project of the Spanish Nation-State, 1909-1938," *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1996), 130; Shlomo Ben-Ami, "The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A Political Reassessment," *Journal of Contemporary History* 12 (1977): 65-84.

¹⁸ Paul Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic (Second Edition)* (Florence, KY: Routledge, 1994), 74-75; Ana Aguado, "Citizenship and Gender Equality in the Second Spanish Republic: Representations and Practices in Socialist Culture (1931-1936)," *Contemporary European History* 23 (2014): 103; Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 25, 45, 48.

economic crises further complicated by the onset of the Great Depression (which hit Europe in the early 1930s), the growing class divide between rich and poor, the inability to adequately fulfill promises made in early political campaigns involving land reform and wealth redistribution, and the rise of fascism and communism.¹⁹ Furthermore, Spain, already an ethnically and linguistically diverse nation, found itself divided in the face of bleak and uncertain prospects.²⁰ By the official start of the Civil War in 1936, Spain had exercised democracy for only five short years, hardly enough time to win over the citizens' trust. This lack of confidence in the new system of government caused critical breaks in the population, leading many to challenge the measures supposedly stipulated for Spain's advancement.²¹

The Spanish military, a traditionally conservative body supporting the monarchy, instigated a revolt against the Second Spanish Republic under the leadership of General Francisco Franco. Military leaders perceived the Republic to be illegitimate, lawless, and "anti-Spain." It accused the newly elected government of betraying the core Spanish values of monarchism, imperialism, and Catholicism. Throughout his life, Franco and his regime cultivated the "myth of the ungovernable Spaniards," the idea that Spanish nationals could

¹⁹ Sara Schatz, "Democracy's Breakdown and the Rise of Fascism: The Case of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931-6," *Social History* 26.2 (2001): 145-146.

²⁰ Helen Graham, "Community, Nation and State in Republican Spain, 1931-1938," *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 133-134.

²¹ Kenneth N. Medhurst, *Government in Spain: The Executive at Work* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973), 18-20; Clare Mar-Molinero, "The Role of Language in Spanish Nation-Building," *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1996), 73-75; Michael Alpert, *Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7-8.

not exercise democratic freedoms due to the supposed “fact” they possessed a temperament too passionate to maintain law and order.²² The war began on July 17, 1936, when Franco’s forces seized control of Morocco and invaded Andalucía. The next morning, he broadcast his famous manifesto from the Canary Islands. In it he declared a “state of war” and incited Spanish Nationalists and Loyalists (those in favor of strong centralized government and the country’s traditional power structures) to rebellion against the “traitorous” Republic.²³

Both sides recruited international militias. The Falangists, or members of Spain’s fascist political party, received aid from Italy and Germany (by early 1937, they had approximately 120,000 new troops). The Republic received limited aid from Stalin and the International Brigades. These “Brigaders,” now celebrated for their valiant efforts to combat the early rise of fascist ideologies in Europe, were comprised of an estimated 35,000 volunteers from 53 countries. Of this number, some 10,000 worked in noncombatant roles, including medical staff, suppliers, and journalists. It is estimated, however, that among the soldiers, no more than 20,000 were active at any given time. In

²² Kenneth N. Medhurst, *Government in Spain: The Executive at Work* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973), 23; Marion Roewekamp, “Spain, Europe, Memory and the Recuperation of the Past,” *Iberoamericana* 13.49 (2013): 185; Oxana Shevel, “The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine,” *Slavic Review* 70.1 (2011): 140; Carolyn P. Boyd, “The Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 617 (2008): 141-143; Carsten Humlebæk, “Remembering the Dictatorship: Commemorative Activity in the Spanish Press on the Anniversaries of the Civil War and the Death of Franco,” *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and Lessons from the Twentieth Century*, Ed. Jerzy W. Borejsza and Klaus Ziemer (New York: Berghan Books, 2006), 495.

²³ Francisco Franco in his broadcast “Manifiesto del General Franco al iniciarse el movimiento militar,” from Las Palmas, Spain, 1936.
<http://ficus.pntic.mec.es/jals0026/documentos/ejcotex.pdf>.

October 1936, the Republic had assumed the nickname “Gobierno de la Victoria” [Government of Victory] and officially organized the “Ejército Popular Regular” (EPR) [Professional Popular Army]. This delayed militarization (largely the result of fierce public opposition) may have cost the Republic the war, as it was poorly organized in the beginning and lacking in central command. Though they did win a number of victories, both large and small, it had already become apparent in 1938 that fortune had taken an unfavorable turn (though the newspaper did not reflect this trend, a topic of analysis in Chapter 3 of this thesis).²⁴

The region of Catalonia in northeastern Spain, with Barcelona as its capital, played a crucial role in the conflict. Considered a hub of democratic, anarchist, and communist forces, Barcelona had flourished under the Republic in a period sometimes termed the “Catalan Oasis.” Catalonia finally achieved its long-sought dream of greater autonomy, passing laws promoting the use of Catalan language in public affairs and celebrating Catalan culture after decades of oppression. This generated a powerful antifascist response and an active resistance that lasted until its defeat. Consequently, the fall of the Republic in 1939 ultimately proved especially crushing to Catalonia, which had fought particularly fiercely in its defense until the bitter end, leaving its population in “a state of physical and material defeat and moral and spiritual devastation.”²⁵ Their “patriotic” news publications of those years would not resurface until Franco’s death in 1975.

²⁴ Michael Alpert, *Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 103.

²⁵ Pelai Pagès i Blanch, *War and Revolution in Catalonia, 1936-1939*, Trans. Patrick L. Gallagher (Boston: Brill, 2013), 169, 174.

The Western Tradition of Wartime Journalism

This section offers a brief review of the existing literature involving the practice of wartime journalism in democratic Western countries, its traits and objectives. A great deal has been written on the wartime propaganda of Franco and the Republic, but no research has focused on the daily periodicals published throughout the war and utilized as the main source of news for locals. In fact, most works containing any reference to Spain's wartime journalism exist in the form of memoirs written by foreign visitors and correspondents, such as George Orwell, Ernest Hemingway, and Arthur Koestler. Unfortunately, these works, while fascinating in their own right, are not scholarly documents with systematic analyses of the periodicals they engaged. Additionally, to date, no analyses have been conducted on the wartime coverage of any Spanish newspaper of the period.

The little research that has been conducted into the case of the Spanish Civil War focuses on several key points: the unreliability of the Republican and Nationalist press, the liberal and conservative "myths" defining them, and the immense challenges affecting reporters in wartime. Both sides produced propaganda designed to "seize upon isolated incidents to make general points" that reinforced their claims.²⁶ Beevor and Figueres, however, note profoundly different trends in the activities of fascist and Republican news agents. While censors were applied on both sides, Republican reporters were allowed relative freedom of movement and the opportunity to voice varied liberal opinions. Fascist reporters, on the other hand, were forced to adhere to strict ideological policies and codes

²⁶ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 245.

in their accounts, and their activities were closely monitored and restricted at all times.²⁷

As previously noted, scholars have observed that “the Spanish Civil War was a magnet for foreign correspondents,” resulting in “initial, hasty impressions passed on by journalists with little first-hand evidence.”²⁸ This was due, in part, to the fact that in the early stages of conflict, “correspondents were rushed into Spain, regardless of whether they spoke the language or understood the country’s politics.” Beevor states that it was even “customary” to send a reporter to the side a news outlet supported. *The New York Times* and the *Chicago Tribune*, for example, supported the Republic, while Catholic periodicals supported Franco.²⁹

As for Spanish war reporters, Figueres points out that they actively participated in ideological battle: “from July of 1936 onward, journalists occupied a position of active fighting.” Republican journalists “participated actively in the defense of the legality of the Republic,” and Nationalist journalists did the same for the military insurgents.³⁰ Most interestingly, he notes that the “tone” of Spanish reporters lay at the intersection of literary and informative narration.³¹ In this way, “the chronicles of war that came out of both camps

²⁷ Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 284, 289-290; Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 242.

²⁸ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 81

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 244.

³⁰ Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 286.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 284.

were not just descriptive; they also introduced values, concepts, and ideas.”³²

Though Spain’s Republican newspapers are now appreciated for their efforts, they have not escaped criticism altogether. As Orwell observed in 1943: “Early in life I had noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain for the first time, I saw newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the relationship which is implied in an ordinary lie...”³³ Figueres similarly asserts that journalism during the Spanish Civil War from all angles involved “disinformation as the norm. Information contained in chronicles was not trustworthy...It was merely atmospheric.”³⁴

It should be noted, however, that wartime journalism is more complex than simply “telling the truth,” as human experience is subject to numerous interpretations. BBC war correspondent Kate Adie once wrote that “the very nature of war confuses the role of the journalist.”³⁵ Indeed, such case studies suggest that inaccuracies and sensationalism may be the inevitable staples of wartime journalism, a practice based upon testimonies limited by restricted access and scope, life-threatening experiences, and personal risk. In these circumstances it proves difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an unbiased view of events.

³² Ibid., 289.

³³ Fearghal McGarry, “Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War,” *Irish Historical Studies* 33.129 (2002): 68.

³⁴ Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil española,” *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* 11 (2005): 289.

³⁵ Kate Adie, “Dispatches from the Front: Reporting War,” *Contemporary Issues in British Journalism* (Vauxhall Lectures, Centre for Journalism Studies: Cardiff University, 1998), 44.

Additionally, journalists face heightened pressures from military, government, and commercial organizations, ultimately shaping their coverage.³⁶ In the case of 1930s Spain, it proved especially difficult for correspondents to verify facts. They were often forced to rely on the emotional or exaggerated accounts of refugees fleeing Nationalist-held regions and answered to powerful political figures and organizations. Indeed, as Beevor observes, the newspapermen of the Spanish Civil War “were as much affected by the emotions of the time as anybody else.”³⁷

Many have focused on the unique qualities of wartime journalism in the United States and other Anglophone traditions, yet there remains much more to be studied concerning international traditions. *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*, for example, offers a series of articles on modern case studies, taken primarily from British and American accounts, referencing and explaining common strategies utilized in wartime reporting from the twentieth century onward.

Newspapers and other print publications have long been associated with facilitating and promoting social movements, from the dissemination of informative or motivational literature to the connecting of communities through a shared source. Even their mastheads “announce” a kind of active participation in such events, as evidenced by *La Vanguardia*’s shifting titles over the course of the twentieth century. Tarrow explains: “while newspapers circulated the idea of movement, movements expanded the market for print, as people tried

³⁶ S. Allen and Barbie Zelizer, “Rules of Engagement: Journalism and War,” *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 3.

³⁷ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 81, 244-245.

to share, if only vicariously—in what was happening around them. By their very mastheads, newspapers announced themselves as agents of movement.”³⁸ Always benefitting from the speed and nuance of new technologies, newspapers were revolutionized yet again by the invention of the camera. With the advent of photography came a new type of war documentation, as reporters could capture images of the destruction they sought to describe in order to compliment featured stories, a tactic which quickly gained popularity.³⁹

However, early examples of photojournalism, such as in the Spanish Civil War, remained somewhat narrow in scope and material, as photographers faced numerous obstacles: “The first war photographers really didn’t photograph war at all. Because of the bulk of their equipment and the length of time it took to make an exposure, they were limited to battleground landscapes, posed pictures of fighters, simulated combat, and portraits of soldiers prior to battle.”⁴⁰ Despite these challenges, photography became an effective tool in the formatting of publications like *La Vanguardia*, and likely served as a kind of “vérité” technique intended to move and persuade audiences in the darkest moments of conflict. Persuasion has been acknowledged as paramount in communication strategies, especially in wartime, during which large populations have a vested interest in the outcome. For this reason, wartime journalism tends to occupy a special status in public perception, resulting in a set of standards for assessment distinct from other media

³⁸ S. G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Third Edition)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 68.

³⁹ Barbie Zelizer, “When War is Reduced to a Photograph,” *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 120.

⁴⁰ Howe in Barbie Zelizer, “When War is Reduced to a Photograph,” *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 121-122.

practices. Often glorified to the point of sensationalism, war reporting assumes an important role in the mediation of conflict for its capacity to influence mass opinion, a concept outlined by Allan and Zelizer in their chapter on the “Rules of Engagement”:

War reporting...demands that notions of what constitutes good journalistic practice be realigned on the basis of different criteria that would typically seem appropriate, criteria thrown into stark relief—at times violently so—by challenging circumstances. At the same time, war reporting’s positioning as a litmus test for journalism also rests on an understanding of its capacity to influence public perceptions.⁴¹

The case of Republican journalism during the Spanish Civil War is unique for the fact that it operated in a democratic society battling autocracy over a prolonged period of time. War reporting has been studied from the perspectives of foreign correspondents and overseas conflict in depth, yet the field of wartime journalism in democracies immediately impacted by violence remains overlooked. Beevor’s scholarship, for example, sheds some light onto the challenging situations reporters faced, but he does not investigate what Republican newspapers (written by native Spaniards) had to say about the conflict. Rather, he is concerned with the timeline of events and political developments in 1930s Spain. Figueres, meanwhile, provides a compelling overview of the dominant narratives of Spanish Civil War chroniclers in the fascist and Republican militias, but his study does not extend to the routine wartime coverage of daily periodicals: First, he limits his discussion to the first-hand accounts of reporters delivered from the front lines who were directly involved in combat. Second, he does not address the shift or evolution of style or content in their accounts over the duration of the war.

It is my hope, therefore, that this thesis will provide insight into a serious gap in

⁴¹ S. Allen and Barbie Zelizer, “Rules of Engagement: Journalism and War,” *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 4.

Spanish media history. My research thus contributes to the study of wartime news coverage in democratic societies by keying in on the hitherto unstudied case of Catalonia's most prominent newspaper during the Spanish Civil War.

Theory: Framing Analysis

Framing theorists have long argued that “framing has important implications for political communication,” and that framing has yet to be applied to the fruitful analysis of media along the socio-political spectrum.⁴² This section revolves around three areas of discussion: It provides a brief outline of framing analysis theory, its development, and present applications; it discusses those aspects of narrative theory relevant to the framing analysis conducted in this thesis; and it assesses Foucault's ideas concerning political discourse and their intimate connection to framing analysis. As Kuypers and Entman, in particular, have acknowledged, the relationships among framing analysis, narrative, and political discourse, however complex, are inevitable as they combine to create and influence meaning.⁴³

This sort of scholarship concerning historical media offers a number of valuable insights that, to my mind, are best suited to the theoretical framework offered by framing

⁴² Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 55.

⁴³ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” *The Art of Rhetorical Criticism*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 187, 191; Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 55; Robert M. Entman, “Framing Media Power,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D'Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 336.

analysis. Although the concept of framing, since it was first introduced in the 1950s by Gregory Bateson and then “imported” into the social sciences by Erving Goffman in his seminal work “Framing Analysis: The Organization of Experience,” has grown to such a point that it often acts as a superfluous “buzz” word in communication research, it remains to be used more meaningfully in the field of media history and the general structuring of news coverage in democratic societies.⁴⁴ Framing analysis allows for the effective examination of newspapers as it emphasizes the construction and organization of content, thus attempting to explain the perceived functions and layout of news media. Whether intentional or not, most theorists agree that the media frame issues in a way that highlights or emphasizes particular aspects over others. Researchers have moved beyond initial framing observations to argue that media sources do in fact tell readers how to consider policy and current events, even if mass reactions fall beyond their direct control. Moreover, the media act as the primary source for the evaluation of political discourse in society. So what better way is there to arrive at an enhanced understanding of the political discourse and the role of media in Republican Spain than through the investigation of a popular and prolific Spanish newspaper of the period?

My use of framing analysis is based upon the ideas of theorists such as Kuypers, Entman, Benford and Snow, and Johnston and Noakes and the contributions they have made to furthering the application of framing analysis to political discourses and social

⁴⁴ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 3; Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Human Experience* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 21-39.
<https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/SOC571E/um/E.Goffman-FrameAnalysis.pdf>

movements. While the debate continues as to the precise direction of influence between news framing and public opinion, a fascinating topic, it fails to contribute to the framing analysis conducted in this thesis. I have paid special attention to the concepts foundational to the present use of framing analysis and their concept of master frames, as well as the terminology of “collective action frames.”⁴⁵ According to Benford and Snow, collective action frames

Perform an interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects of “the world out there,” in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists. Thus, collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of social movement organizations.⁴⁶

My research focuses on those frames present in the historical artifacts as opposed to a speculation surrounding the real-life correlation between a series of frames and the outcome of a war. Simply put, collective action framing involves “the process of defining what is going on in a situation in order to encourage protest” and comprises three primary components of identity, agency, and injustice. As Naples, Swidler, and Snow and Benford have pointed out, culture plays an important part in this process, as “a person’s social experiences are made meaningful by shared components” of particular societal constructs, many of which derive from a shared cultural background.⁴⁷

As will be discussed in the next chapters, my research yielded two distinct master

⁴⁵ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 9.

⁴⁶ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 614.

⁴⁷ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 9.

collective action frames of analysis I have named: (1) The Spanish Civil War as International Conflict frame and (2) The Media as Guardian of Democracy frame. These frames collaborated to present the war as part of a greater global crisis, which pitted the popular will of the people against that of a brutal dictatorship. The Republic represented a just and democratic government and Barcelona's *La Vanguardia* represented its trusted voice. Noakes and Johnston define a "master frame" as "a more general, but especially powerful—in that it evokes powerful cultural symbols—interpretative package." In this way "master frames are linked to cycles of protest—periods of intense social movement activity in which the mobilization of various movements overlap in time are often linked to one another."⁴⁸

It is important to note, however, that frames are far from fixed or stable, as they tend to develop in response to the matter at hand and evolve accordingly. Furthermore, while frames may be cultivated over a given period, they do not necessarily emerge on a conscious level, and may take time to operate effectively: "Observers in Western nations have noted that framing processes are generally less conscious at the beginning of a movement, becoming more strategic as the battle is waged."⁴⁹ This statement certainly appears true of *La Vanguardia*, which did not even begin to acknowledge the inevitability of war until late July of 1936, nearly two full weeks after Franco delivered his manifesto. For this reason, I have presented a brief overview of the emergence and development of each frame until their ultimate maturity in 1938. In this way, the aforementioned frames

⁴⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 7.

became clearer, sharper, more dominant, and more poignant as the war progressed, even to the point of sentimentality by the end:

Although framing processes are “active, ongoing, and continuously evolving” and no person or organization can fully control this process, the role of social movement entrepreneurs in the construction of collective action frames is crucial...If we acknowledge that frames are constructed from a cultural fabric and that they have a specific content, we can describe the ‘materials’ that make them up—that is, the components of an interpretive schema...To explain their actions and to motivate participants, movements must produce interpretive packages that explain a range of problems in relatively narrow terms, highlight some issues, and ignore others. The process of assembling these packages is historically specific, but there are patterns across movements in the kinds of materials assembled.⁵⁰

Framing may be used to perform several important functions: to keep the public informed of major events and guide their interests, to help make sense of complicated affairs, and to promote political/ideological agendas in a more persuasive and palatable way. According to Williams, “movements must produce rhetorical packages that explain their claims within extant, culturally legitimate boundaries.”⁵¹ The two master frames I explore encompassed those boundaries, communicating important cultural and social values and promoting a sense of fellowship to enhance collective action in Republican Barcelona until the end of the war.⁵²

Framing analysis, by nature, requires an understanding of culture, context, narrative, and discourse for they interact with one another in order to create meaning. As

⁵⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁵¹ R. H. Williams and Timothy J. Kubal, “Movement Frames and the Cultural Environment: Resonance, Failure, and the Boundaries of the Legitimate,” *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change* 21 (1999): 247.

⁵² “Republican Barcelona” refers to Barcelona as part of the popularly elected Second Spanish Republic which governed Spain from 1931-1939.

Kuypers argues: “Frames are central organizing ideas within a narrative account of an issue or event.”⁵³ Entman agrees: “We can define *framing* as the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation.”⁵⁴ Because frames emerge as a set of patterns and highlights via language and content, both of which are deeply embedded in the socio-political circumstances and cultural realities of a particular group of a particular time period, they push the researcher to evaluate these “interpretive packages” within a bigger, more complex arena.⁵⁵ As Tannen writes regarding “frames and the communication process,” “meaning is never totally determinate but rather is...a joint production.”⁵⁶ Moreover, communication scholars have pointed out that “framing also is a process based in and bound by culture, and it reflects how forces and groups in society try to shape public discourse about an issue.”⁵⁷

⁵³ Jim A. Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 198.

⁵⁴ Robert M. Entman, “Framing Media Power,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 336.

⁵⁵ Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, *Theories of Human Communication, Tenth Edition* (Long Grove: Waveband Press, Inc., 2011), 344.

⁵⁶ Suwako Watanabe, “Cultural Differences in Framing,” *Framing in Discourse*, Ed. Deborah Tannen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 178.

⁵⁷ Stephen D. Reese, “Prologue: Framing Public Life: A Bridging Model for Media Research,” *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*, Ed. Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy Jr., and August E. Grant (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001), 147; Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models,” *Journal of Communication* 57 (2007): 13; Baldwin Van Gorp, “The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In,” *Journal of Communication* 57 (2007): 60-78.

Frames are designed to invoke “images that are rich, distinctive, and memorable for the ways they crystallize understanding.”⁵⁸ They incorporate metaphors and narratives to convey messages that resonate with their audience in a particular way. They offer a simplified interpretation of events to facilitate public comprehension of a complex and ever-changing world. They cultivate a sense of clarity and consistency to mediate the chaos and anxiety of conflict.⁵⁹ Frames serve to produce what Lippmann terms the “pseudo-environment,” “for the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance.”⁶⁰ Entman similarly explains that “through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others.”⁶¹

I should clarify that my notion of discourse derives from Foucault’s discussion of the concept. In his introduction to *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*, he writes that “the most radical discontinuities are the breaks effected by a work of theoretical transformation ‘which establishes a science by detaching it from the ideology

⁵⁸ Gail T. Fairhurst and Robert A. Starr, *The Art of Framing* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996), 100.

⁵⁹ Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, *Theories of Human Communication, Tenth Edition* (Long Grove: Waveband Press, Inc., 2011), 341, 344.

⁶⁰ Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, *Theories of Human Communication, Tenth Edition* (Long Grove: Waveband Press, Inc., 2011), 341; Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 16.

⁶¹ Robert Entman, “Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents,” *Journal of Communication* 41.4 (1991): 248-249.

of its past by revealing this past as ideological.”⁶² In advancing discourse beyond the mechanical aspects of language to embrace the institutionalized patterns of societal structures over time, Foucault is among the first to recognize the importance of analyzing the perceived “ruptures” and “interruptions” in the supposed continuous progression of human history and knowledge.⁶³ As Noakes and Johnson also argue: “all social movements must ‘break the frames’ of quiescence and acceptance of the status quo that characterizes everyday life.”⁶⁴ The proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931 and the ensuing civil war, which represented a drastic break from the long-held Spanish traditions of church and monarchy, as expressed in their political discourse, serve as an example of one such interruption.

According to Foucault, knowledge inhabits a social structure that changes along with the power shifts that inevitably occur over time. He defines discourse as

...the notion of “spirit,” which enables us to establish between the simultaneous or successive phenomena of a given period a community of meanings, symbolic links, an interplay of resemblance and reflexion, or which allows the sovereignty of collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of unity and explanation...As soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-evidence; indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse.⁶⁵

In this way, political discourse may be perceived as the patterns of language surrounding

⁶² Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 5.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 200.

⁶⁴ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 7.

⁶⁵ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 22, 23.

the political scene of a given society at a given time. After all, communication scholars tend to agree that “the choice of language is strictly determined by the hierarchical social structure,” so previous editions of newspapers such as *La Vanguardia* thus preserve for media historians a kind of screenshot of the political discourses of the past.⁶⁶

Johnson-Cartee makes this the central point of her book *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality*, in which she argues that “knowledge is socially constructed, and the news media, in particular, play an increasingly powerful role in the process of constructing political reality.”⁶⁷ This necessitates the construction of frames, as frames serve to organize a narrative designed to communicate a series of events within the context of a specific culture and place. Intentionally or not, then, media sources distort said events according to a simplified or strategic interpretation of the social and political reality they inhabit. While narratives are always present in every human artifact, times of crisis give rise to especially provocative rhetoric, as they tend to emerge out of perceived societal transformations that threaten established traditions. As Nathan Crick states: “The language of ‘event’ provides a way to highlight the fact that rhetoric always thrives in a certain eventful environment whose totality is always beyond our powers of representation, an environment in which events are surprising, unanticipatable, and always entail a reversal of a relationship of forces.”⁶⁸ Hence, those periods that Foucault terms “ruptures” in the grand narrative of history produce the most compelling rhetorical structures of all, as they

⁶⁶ Suwako Watanabe, “Cultural Differences in Framing,” *Framing in Discourse*, Ed. Deborah Tannen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 180.

⁶⁷ Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 147.

⁶⁸ Nathan Crick, “Rhetoric and Events,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 47.3 (2014): 254.

reveal profound societal transformations that challenge the status quo. The Spanish Civil War, a conflict which erupted in the form of a campaign intended to counteract the Spanish Revolution of 1930, is a notable example of one such rupture.

In accordance with this line of thought, scholars have come to understand that media play a central role in the evolution of discourse, as

Media are more than merely passive and transparent conveyors of information. They play an active role in shaping our understanding of the past, in “mediating” between us (readers, viewers, listeners) and past experiences, and hence in setting the agenda for future acts of remembrance within society...media are themselves caught up in a dynamic of their own...media are always ‘emergent’ rather than stable, and technology for meaning-making and networking emerge in relation to each other and in reaction to each other.⁶⁹

Consequently, media construct narratives within specially designed frames to convey information, and in so doing, influence interpretations of the past, the present, and the future. Journalism, then, as a product of human agency, is similarly ideological in nature.⁷⁰ Moreover, as Johnson-Cartee and McNair contend, the news itself functions as narrative.⁷¹ McNair writes: “Journalism, therefore, like any other narrative which is the work of human agency, is essentially *ideological*—a communicative vehicle for the transmission to an audience (intentionally or otherwise) not just of facts but of the assumptions, attitudes, beliefs and values of its maker(s), drawn from and expressive of a particular world-view.”⁷² According to this view, news narratives are the product of a “multilayered and

⁶⁹ Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 3.

⁷⁰ Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 157.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 156-160.

⁷² Brian McNair, *The Sociology of Journalism* (London: Arnold, 1998), 6.

multidirectional process” known as our “mediated political reality.”⁷³

Narrative has been recognized by increasing numbers of communication scholars “as a significant human artifact.”⁷⁴ Fisher states: “the idea of human beings as storytellers indicates the generic form of all symbol composition; it holds that symbols are created and communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to human experience and to induce others to dwell in them to establish ways of living in common.”⁷⁵ It is important to note, however, that the narrative of events and the reality of events, though connected, remain distinct from one another. Narrative certainly helps to contribute an understanding of experience, but just like the social structures and institutions that govern our lives, it is human-made and as such, artificial.

Narrative and discourse maintain a close relationship, depending upon one another to mature and flourish. Consequently, narratives may be found at the center of every discourse, as discourse involves the study of systems of language and thought and the conversations they cultivate. Indeed, it is difficult to assess one aspect without the other, and each contributes to the shaping of cultural and political discourse. In the context of political discourse, narrative must generally be framed in simplistic enough terms to persuade the public of a point of view. For this reason, news narratives often lack the subtle

⁷³ Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 181.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁷⁵ Walter Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communications Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument,” *Communications Monographs* 51: 1-22; Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 149.

or multidimensional frames of literary narratives.⁷⁶ Political narratives, like all narratives, are primarily composed of four parts: characters, setting, plot, and theme. These components are, in turn, born out of the political discourse of the era and are packaged for the masses in a series of interpretive frames which serve to make sense of the otherwise elusive human experience:

The rise, fall, and marginalization of stories as constitutive parts of the dynamics of remembering have thus merged as key issues in memory studies. This turn towards memorial dynamics demands among other things new insight into the factors which allow certain collective memories to become hegemonic or, conversely, allow hitherto marginalized memories to gain prominence in the public arena...⁷⁷

Public opinion is constantly in flux as the ideological narrative foundation shifts with major events. In war, when the public tends to feel threatened in an existential way, ruptures in the fabric of political discourse become frequent and inevitable.

Framing in mass communication has yet to be established as a consistent (or, at least, harmonious) body of ideas for constructive discussion in the field, yet it is more or less unified on a single front in the assertion that “framing appears to be a central power in the democratic process, for political elites control the framing of issues.”⁷⁸ As Entman articulates “whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text.”⁷⁹ This thesis upholds this premise, but

⁷⁶ Robert Rowland, “The Narrative Perspective,” *The Art of Rhetorical Criticism*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 136.

⁷⁷ Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 2.

⁷⁸ Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 57.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

further engages the concept by studying the capacity of media frames to “reflect the play of power and boundaries of discourse over an issue.”⁸⁰ I subsequently adhere to Myra Macdonald’s applications of Foucault to media discourse, thus expanding these applications to historical media.⁸¹ Like Macdonald, my definition of discourse refers to “a system of communicative practices that are integrally related to wider social and cultural practices, and that help to construct specific frameworks of thinking” so that I might contribute an understanding of the “*process* of making meaning.”⁸² She argues that “the merit of the Foucauldian approach lies in underlining how many of these [media] decisions rest on routine responses that are informed by culturally and socially acceptable ways of thinking.”⁸³ Because Foucault “insists on investigating the operation of discourse in specific times and situations, adopting a methodology that is essentially historical,” my study involves a similarly Foucauldian perspective.⁸⁴ Foucault’s seminal ideas are committed to revealing “the interaction between discursive change and the operation of knowledge and power” so as “to do justice to the specific twists and turns of historical development,” making his notions of discourse in times of “rupture” central to my investigation of a crucial instance of political communication in Spanish history.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Ibid., 55.

⁸¹ Myra Macdonald, *Exploring Media Discourse* (Chatham: Arnold, 2003), 16-19.

⁸² Ibid., 1.

⁸³ Ibid., 21.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 16.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 16-17.

In agreement with Norman Fairclough's conception that as scholars we should "concentrate our attention upon changes in the societal order of discourse during a particular period," I analyze the frames presented by a Barcelona newspaper during the Second Spanish Republic, a brief era in Spanish history that defied all traditional notions of the past and enacted a vital break with Spain's most prominent power structures and institutions.⁸⁶ Consequently, my use of framing theory departs from conventional analyses in two ways. First, I have applied it to a single newspaper in the distant past. Existing framing analyses in the communication literature involve numerous periodicals' and other news outlets' coverage of controversial events in the present or the recent past, often discerning their comparative elements, while my analysis focuses exclusively on the coverage of *La Vanguardia* in the years 1936-1939.⁸⁷ Second, I have used framing analysis to observe the organization of media content in relation to the shifting power structures of an important period of sudden change and instability in Spanish history. I expand upon the subjects of journalism history and my methodology in the following section.

Methodology: Journalism History

This thesis examines the frames created by a specific Spanish newspaper (*La Vanguardia*) during the Spanish Civil War as it was happening. After all, communication historians such as myself seek not to construct new narratives based upon the

⁸⁶ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 200.

⁸⁷ Jim A. Kuypers, "Framing Analysis," *The Art of Rhetorical Criticism*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 206-207; Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 55.

conglomeration of disparate materials; we seek to identify those narratives already penned by contemporaries at the time of conflict.

I read hundreds of editions of *La Vanguardia* (all of which are free and accessible through their online “hemeroteca” or database) from the start of the war on July 17, 1936 to the fall of Barcelona on January 25, 1939. I focused on the first five pages of each edition, as these pages contained the day’s most important headlines and the sections on national and international news. I went through *La Vanguardia* day by day, making sure to pay special attention to dates of particular significance (i.e., major battles and military campaigns).

I identified frames by adhering to Entman’s method of pinpointing “the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.”⁸⁸ In this way, I looked for metaphors, concepts, and visual images that consistently appeared in the editions’ top articles, photos, and cartoons.⁸⁹ Consequently, this thesis sets out to detect and to evaluate those frames constructed by Barcelona’s *La Vanguardia* in wartime, how they operated over the course of the conflict, and how they shaped meaning.

In agreement with communication history methodologists Sloan and Stamm that “in communication history research, there has been too much reliance on secondary sources...on other historians rather than on the historical subjects themselves,” I have

⁸⁸ Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1993): 52.

⁸⁹ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” *The Art of Rhetorical Criticism*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 197.

incorporated numerous excerpts from *La Vanguardia* itself, as “primary sources are the raw materials of history” so that the audience may read the newspaper in literal translation without having to depend exclusively on my interpretation of the text.⁹⁰ I have translated all excerpts myself in order to ensure their accuracy and integrity. As Kuypers unequivocally states, “the best framing analyses allow the rhetorical artifacts to speak for themselves.”⁹¹

Using other one-year studies by W. Joseph Campbell, Felipe Fernández-Armesto, David McCullough, David Howarth, and Lloyd and Dorothy Moote as my model, I elected to place my emphasis on the final year of the war in order to illustrate the intensity of news coverage during that period and the insights it offered into the concept of communicating resistance in a losing cause.⁹² Single-year studies have enjoyed quite a bit of recognition in subfields of history, appreciated for their ability to “clarify trends, issues, and developments that otherwise might be obscured in the sweep of historiography...The in-depth quality of a year study can identify and bring depth and fresh understanding to what

⁹⁰ David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 194-196.

⁹¹ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” *The Art of Rhetorical Criticism*, Ed. Jim A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 207.

⁹² W. Joseph Campbell, “Fresh Methodologies Could Invigorate Journalism History,” *Clio: Newsletter of the History Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication* 42.3 (Spring 2008): 6-8. <http://aejmc.us/history/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2012/12/08springclio.pdf>; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *1492: The Year the World Began* (Harper Collins e-Books, 2009); David G. McCullough, *1776* (Barcelona: Belacqva, 2006); David Howarth, *1066: The Year of the Conquest* (New York: Penguin Books, 1981); A. Lloyd Moote and Dorothy C. Moote, *The Great Plague The Story of London's Most Deadly Year* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

is often regarded as familiar and commonplace.”⁹³ Certain years are considered pivotal in the greater scheme of world history. While contemporary audiences may not have perceived their experiences as pertaining to a specific or finite period of time, historians can identify them in hindsight. Consequently, single-year studies offer a number of advantages that studies concerning more expansive durations may not; primarily, that is, the detailed exploration of a single year in its full complexity without allowing it to be summarized as simply one year among many, lost in a blur of decades or even centuries. It is my hope that by paying special attention to 1938, a seminal year in Spanish history, I have contributed to a deeper understanding of Republican Barcelona in the face of defeat.

When addressing the subject of history in any field, one must first face a number of impossibilities. For one, historians are limited in our reach, as we are granted only incomplete access to the past. We can merely grasp at the surviving documents, such as periodicals, magazines, posters, advertisements, memoirs, and testimonials of an era distanced from us in time and space. A common method utilized by historians is to impose upon the materials at hand a particular narrative that allows us to make sense of the human experience. For this reason I have devoted a brief explanation of the complex, if inevitable, relationships among framing analysis, narrative, and political discourse. Therefore, it is the duty of media historians to address past narratives within the context of their time rather than attempt to transplant them into the present by assuming that their meanings are fixed or stable. As Felipe Fernández-Armesto writes in his introduction to *1492: The Year the*

⁹³ W. Joseph Campbell, “Fresh Methodologies Could Invigorate Journalism History,” *Clio: Newsletter of the History Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication* 42.3 (Spring 2008): 6-8. <http://aejmc.us/history/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2012/12/08springclio.pdf>.

World Began, “historians’ job is not to explain the present but to understand the past—to recapture a sense of what it felt like to live in it.”⁹⁴

Although at moments in contention with one another, media historians have addressed the highly interdisciplinary nature of journalism history and the need for the field to expand, restructure, and invigorate. This section offers an overview of journalism history, its mission to provide valuable insights into the role and foci of historical media, and the methodology I have utilized to ensure the highest possible level of accuracy and integrity concerning my contribution to the field.

In “The Problem of Journalism History,” Carey calls for a “cultural history of the press.” More specifically, he describes the need for a narrative that recovers “past forms of imagination, of historical consciousness” and urges media historians to reimagine, if not reconstruct, how it felt “to live and act in a particular period of human history.”⁹⁵ He connects these ideas specifically to media history by arguing that “when we study the history of journalism we are principally studying a way in which men in the past have grasped reality.” He summarizes “the central and as yet unwritten history of journalism is the history of the idea of a report.”⁹⁶ In defining the press as the idea of a report, he reinforces his argument for the need for a cultural history which seeks to understand past communities’ understanding of and experience of journalism. Carey

⁹⁴ Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *1492: The Year the World Began* (Harper Collins e-Books, 2009), 50.

⁹⁵ James W. Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History,” *Journalism History* (Spring 1974): 4.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

holds journalism to be dualistic in nature, both a literary and industrial art. To this effect, he even recalls Proust: “the central story in journalism has been largely banished from our remembrance of things past.”

Sloan and Stamm, meanwhile, in their third chapter of *Historical Methods in Communication* titled “The Fundamentals of Good History,” seek to lay out the appropriate groundwork for the field. They insist that in order for journalism history to rise in the world of academia, they must first understand the principles of quality historical research more generally. They go on to examine the standards that ought to be in place for communication historians in order to pursue “excellence.”⁹⁷ While acknowledging the difficulty of defining “good history,” they outline seven criteria: (1) topic definition (the shaping of boundaries and approximation of material that ensures “continuity of content” and a proper sense of time and space); (2) bibliographic soundness (the gathering of a variety of sources, including authorities on relevant subjects and periodical literature); (3) research (as “evidence is the grist of history,” researchers must find, evaluate, and reconstruct it or a “segment of the past based upon it”); (4) accuracy (the investigation into the “reality” of the time); (5) explanation (the “explication of sources” and generalizations/interpretation of findings); (6) historical understanding (“having understanding of the circumstances and personalities pertaining to a study”); and (7) writing (the construction of a quality and captivating narrative which upholds the standards of both good history and good writing). Journalism historians are expected to be truthful to the greatest possible extent, to “understand the

⁹⁷ David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 51-53.

past on its own terms,” and to “demonstrate judgment that is honest, perceptive, and balanced.”⁹⁸

Others split from the “historical imagination” and “cultural history” ideals in interesting ways, at points outright contesting them. In “The Paradoxes of Journalism History,” Conboy states that “in order to extricate journalism from broader media history, we need to develop better ways of understanding the generic characteristics of journalism over time and across geopolitical space” and then outlines what he terms to be the “five paradoxes of journalism history.”⁹⁹ These paradoxes are: (1) “journalism is not a fixed range of practices and there is little consensus about its essential nature”; (2) the past practices of journalism can serve to help us understand the future of journalism, as well as its present; (3) journalism needs to “develop specific understandings of journalism within national contexts...to consider how it has formed and mutated over the centuries as a global phenomenon”; (4) “the paradox of the popular” (that is, the complex and contradictory relationship of its vested interest in the public audience that stimulated its beginnings and development though which may now be the primary threat to its survival); and (5) the incorporation of new technologies into current practices, rather than allowing those technologies to stimulate “innovative impetus.”¹⁰⁰

Marzolf, Conboy, Hampton, and Schudson thus argue the need for journalism

⁹⁸ Ibid., 55.

⁹⁹ Martin Conboy, “The Paradoxes of Journalism History,” *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 30.3 (September 2010): 411.

¹⁰⁰ David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 412-415.

historians to set a bold structural framework for the study of journalism history so that such scholars might consistently achieve standards of excellence that invigorate, cultivate, and elevate the field. To this end, they identify a number of challenges facing its development, such as the inevitable harsh criticism of shifting to new methods over traditional approaches, the need for basic resources such as proper funding and technology, and the general philosophical paradoxes effecting historical scholarship at all levels.

Though the authors disagree on the requirements of future journalism history scholarship, they all overwhelmingly agree on the need for the discipline's complete renovation, as well as the crucial importance of acquiring an "understanding" of journalism history in order to recognize and appreciate its present practice and future potential. Carey argues the need for better writing and greater imagination among historians so as to gain respect and a wider audience, while Schudson and Conboy focus first and foremost on the need for stronger systematical methods for its framework in order to tackle the key paradoxes influencing its premise.

I have thus attempted to satisfy these demands and to address the current "gaps" in the study of journalism history for the fact that journalism has played—and continues to play—an important role in the organization and development of democratic societies. As Robert W. Desmond wrote in the preface to his *The Information Process*, "the press provides a service to the public and at the same time is recording what will become history." Moreover, he argues that this essentially makes them "the first historians" and that "the history of the press itself is a part of the social history of mankind in his search

for information and understanding.”¹⁰¹

For this reason, I have utilized the “bottom-up” approach to historical research methods. That is, I approached the archives and all primary sources without a preconceived notion or theory of what I would—or should—find. While it is humanly impossible, of course, to assess anything with a truly pure or untainted mind, I did not assume beforehand that my research would conform to any particular theory or framework. I have done my best to fulfill those standards outlined by Sloan and Stamm who state that “interpretation should not be predetermined. The good historian does not set out with a theory and marshal facts to fit it.” In this way, “The best history is always a search for truth...Historians should gather all the relevant facts and then ask what conclusions may be drawn from them.”¹⁰²

According to Entman, “frames can be detected by probing for particular words and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey thematically consistent meanings across media and time.”¹⁰³ Frames can be either generic or issue-specific, and both are detectable via their repeated usage of particular themes.¹⁰⁴ In this thesis I observe Kuypers’ approach which “begins inductively by looking for themes

¹⁰¹ Robert W. Desmond, *The Information Process: World News Reporting To the Twentieth Century* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1978), xii.

¹⁰² David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 24.

¹⁰³ Robert Entman, “Framing US Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents,” *Journal of Communication* 41.4 (1991): 248.

¹⁰⁴ Rens Vliegenthart, “Framing in Mass Communication Research: An Overview and Assessment,” *Sociology Compass* 6.12 (2012): 939.

that reside within new narratives across time and then determining how those themes are framed.”¹⁰⁵ As Levin also explains, “the reason themes are taken as a measure of the presence of frames is the difficulty of finding a completely developed frame in a single press release. Frames are built across a series of news media articles, and not all elements are present in any single article.”¹⁰⁶ In this way, I identified a number of themes consistently present in *La Vanguardia*’s coverage and subsequently traced their emergence and development in the years 1936-1939. My research revealed that these themes, which I have organized into their corresponding frames of The Spanish Civil War as International Conflict frame and The Media as Guardian of Democracy frame, emerged early on but became especially profound and revealing during the final year of Barcelona’s involvement in the conflict (January 1938–January 1939).

Throughout this thesis I follow what is known as the *public discourse or social movement approach to framing*, an approach which “treats the news media mostly as a ‘carrier’ for frames promoted by public agents and considers media content to be an indicator of public discourse.”¹⁰⁷ This is not to say that the media lack agency. In treating the media as a “carrier” for frames, I emphasize (in accordance with Kuypers) that the

¹⁰⁵ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 298.

¹⁰⁶ Levin in Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 302.

¹⁰⁷ Bertram T. Scheufele and Dietram A. Scheufle, “Of Spreading Activation, Applicability, and Schemas: Conceptual Distinctions and Their Operational Implications for Measuring Frames and Framing Effects,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 111-112.

media do not operate in a vacuum, but are influenced by an extant body of ideas and social practices that shape their communicative functions and processes. In accordance with this method, the next chapters provide analyses of the evolution of two major frames found in the source text: first, the Spanish Civil War as International Conflict frame, in which the Spanish Civil War was framed in terms of a global battle for democracy as opposed to a simple military uprising; and second, the Media as Guardian of Democracy frame, in which *La Vanguardia* framed itself as a pillar of democratic fortitude for the sustenance of a new and egalitarian Spain.

In both chapters, I examine and explain their connection to the turning points of the war, their cultural and political implications, and the way they package key revolutionary messages that reflect those “ruptures” in the established power structures described by Foucault. Historians of all disciplines tend to share the assertion that “the historical narrative, a mixture of storytelling and explanation based on evidence and intuition, is one of the oldest forms of investigation that have characterized the study of humankind.”¹⁰⁸ In so doing, this thesis embodies a cultural history of Barcelona under siege in the final year of the Spanish Civil War, now recognized as the conflict to set the stage for World War II.

¹⁰⁸ David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 256-257.

CHAPTER 2

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AS INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FRAME

Introduction

Though officially declared a civil war by both Spaniards and foreigners at the outset of armed conflict in July 1936, *La Vanguardia* framed it as a global battle for democratic liberties. This chapter analyzes the newspaper's framing of the Spanish Civil War not as a civil war but as an international conflict. This frame is established through the repetition of two major themes: (1) it claims the existence of a unified Spanish identity and (2) it emphasizes Barcelona's key position in the war. In so doing, this frame highlights the perspective that Catalonia makes up a vital and integral part of Spain, and that Barcelona, as its capital, exerts a powerful and unique influence over world affairs. The first section traces the emergence of this theme in 1936-1937, while the other two sections provide a detailed investigation of the evolution and profound articulation of The Spanish Civil War as International Conflict Frame over the course of 1938-1939.

Emergence and Development

From the beginning of the war in 1936, *La Vanguardia* consistently referred to the Falangists in the following terms: "los rebeldes" [the rebels], "las fascistas" [the fascists], and occasionally even "los extranjeros" [the foreigners]. Meanwhile, the terms it applied

to the Republic's armies included "leales" [loyalists], "republicanos" [Republicans], and "españoles" [Spaniards]. It frequently framed the Republic as the "legitimate government," while framing the Falangists, the Spanish forces commanded by Francisco Franco, as "illegitimate rebels," "fascists," and "tyrants." Furthermore, articles referring to Franco and his supporters were closely intertwined with the names of Mussolini and Hitler in order to emphasize their transparent alliance. Every wartime edition included an international section, labeled "Extranjero" [Foreign], which delivered news pertaining to the agreements among European countries, their increasingly hostile relations, and the "exposure" of Nazi aid sent to Franco's Nationalists despite Hitler's assurances to the contrary. One such headline from November 21, 1936 read: "The British Press unmasks yet again the direct aid of the Nazis to the Spanish Rebels."¹⁰⁹

La Vanguardia defined the Spanish Civil War as a war waged against Spain from all sides, its prized Republic under siege from well beyond its borders in articles with headlines such as "Spain Before The World," "The Invading Troops," "The People and the Army Against the Invaders," "Our War for Independence," and warnings against "the intervention of foreign fascism."¹¹⁰ It documented Italian and German attacks on Spanish nationals and pleaded for the assistance of democratic nations such as Britain, France, and the United States. To emphasize the international dimension of the war it contained notices and messages from foreign diplomats and soldiers fighting in the famed International Brigades. For example, a brief article titled "A Greeting From Bulgaria" printed October

¹⁰⁹ *La Vanguardia*, November 21, 1936.

¹¹⁰ *La Vanguardia*, June 26, 1937; *La Vanguardia*, February 7, 1937; *La Vanguardia*, September 18, 1938; *La Vanguardia*, July 21, 1938.

22, 1936 included the note:

We, Bulgarian soldiers of a regiment stationed near the capital, have followed the course of events in Spain with great interest. We do not go a single moment without remembering the heroic fight that the Spanish people sustain against the rebel generals. We wish to send our revolutionary greeting to those that on the front defend democracy against fascism, taking up arms for the sustenance and liberty of their children. We know that your fight is also the fight of the world's proletariats against the invader, fascism, and that your triumph shall also be ours.¹¹¹

La Vanguardia frequently featured messages of this nature quoting sympathetic foreigners who supported their cause. In so doing, it highlighted the intricate interdependency of international affairs in the modern age and linked the fight for Spain to the greater fight for the survival of liberal ideals worldwide.

La Vanguardia also featured major headlines welcoming and honoring the International Brigades and other foreign volunteers. The paper thus framed fascism as a kind of disease spreading across Europe, threatening to eradicate liberal values. It suggested that if the Republic were to fall, the sickness would infect still more countries. The paper maintained that Spain was merely the first battleground in the lead up to a second world war:

And so Spain has been converted into a field of military maneuvers and experimentation for greater future horrors still to come, for a host of mortalities a hundred times what is being produced within our borders. As Spain bleeds out, her national body covered head to toe in injuries; as Franco threatens to multiply bombings and to leave not a single stone unturned; as dozens of thousands of Spanish lives are lost and incalculable riches destroyed...¹¹²

Such headlines were probably intended to increase anti-Franco sentiments among Barcelona's citizens by pointing out the lies and abuses of Fascist countries, but also

¹¹¹ *La Vanguardia*, October 22, 1936.

¹¹² *La Vanguardia*, November 22, 1936.

functioned as a warning to the rest of the free world that fascism could not be trusted:

The Operations of International Fascism Attempt to Deal a Blow to Collective Security: Registers a strong reaction in the European circles opposed to the Italo-German attitude. The “Pravda” claims that the Interventionists violate the international agreements and transform diplomatic relations into a farce.¹¹³

In this way, *La Vanguardia* revealed a striking awareness of its large and diverse audience. Its director clearly recognized that, as Barcelona’s leading newspaper (and one disseminated so close to the French border, no less), *La Vanguardia* was a point of interest to the international community, and so was closely followed by foreign nationals as well as the native Spaniards for whom it was originally intended. From early on the Republic realized that it stood little chance of winning the war without foreign intervention. Many of these articles, therefore, intended to persuade other, more powerful democratic nations such as the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Canada to join the Republican cause. In an example from November 8, 1936, the same day that Madrid received its first battalion of international volunteers (others had arrived in Albacete in October):¹¹⁴

The Republic Speaks: Madison Square Garden is one of the largest stadiums in the world...The Spain of the people went to speak to the people of New York crowding into Madison Square Garden. The people of New York, so indifferent to everything foreign, responded en masse to learn about Spain, to applaud Spain, to raise money for Spain. I tell you this, proletariats of Catalonia and of Spain, that nowhere in the world have you better or more enthusiastic friends than in North America.¹¹⁵

Such articles likely served two purposes: (1) they gave Catalonians a sense of hope (though

¹¹³ *La Vanguardia*, August 6, 1937.

¹¹⁴ Victor Howard and Mac Reynolds, *The Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion: The Canadian Contingent in the Spanish Civil War* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1986), 17.

¹¹⁵ *La Vanguardia*, November 8, 1936.

false) that the United States might come to their aid, thus cultivating a kind of fervor intended to sustain a strong and unified resistance to rebel insurgents, and (2) they urged Americans to join the fight against Fascism by appealing to popular roots rather than government officials. Recruitment remains perhaps the most “crucial task for social movements,” and few studies have explored how framing may influence a movement’s ability to attract participants.¹¹⁶ While the Republic drew in thousands of American volunteers, it was never able to garner the support it so desperately needed from the United States Government, which perceived it as a symptom of the Marxist Uprisings in Eastern Europe.

More than appealing to potential allies, however, *La Vanguardia* went so far as to respond directly to the “lies” propagated by Spain’s “enemies.” On one occasion, it appears, Italian diplomats in Geneva requested that Spain depend less on international arms, citing its “proclamation” that Spain refused to “eliminate” foreign elements from the war. Italian officials consequently implied that the Republic’s defense was comprised mainly of international brigades, as if the Falangists consisted primarily of Spanish nationals by comparison. On October 2, 1936 and again on October 12, 1937, *La Vanguardia* printed articles addressing outright these claims before the international community. In the first, it demanded that Italy and Germany keep out of the war and cease exporting arms and soldiers to Franco.¹¹⁷ In the second, it insisted that Republican Spain

¹¹⁶ Lyndie Hewitt and Holly J. McCammon, “Explaining Suffrage Mobilization: Balance, Neutralization, and Range in Collective Action Frames,” *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 33.

¹¹⁷ *La Vanguardia*, October 2, 1936.

had never made any such statement.¹¹⁸ The paper went on to argue that the Republic would be happy to dismiss the foreign militias fighting alongside them should the fascists agree to do the same. In this way, the newspaper countered Italo-Fascist claims by reiterating the extent of their involvement in the conflict.

Consequently, the master frame discussed at length in this section functioned as a primarily diagnostic frame, intended to present a new interpretation of events and identify causes.¹¹⁹ In this case, it redefined the term “civil war,” generally involving a purely internal or national matter, as a global crisis. *La Vanguardia* thus “diagnosed” the problem as fascism and suggested that the only “cure” was to defeat Franco in Spain, the earlier the better. This frame which emerged in the earliest stages of conflict markedly intensified so that by 1938, every edition of the newspaper printed articles explicitly arguing against the “foreign invasion of Spain.”¹²⁰

As previously mentioned, 1938 proved a difficult year for Spain. The war worsened as critical battles were lost, fortress cities submitted to fascist rule, and scores of soldiers died at the front to no avail. Hunger plagued the nation and thousands succumbed to dehydration, pernicious anemia, and other conditions resulting from malnutrition.¹²¹ The Catalan Offensive was set to begin and refugees fled in record numbers to the stronghold of Barcelona. No one, it seemed, was safe, even if far removed from the direct impact of

¹¹⁸ *La Vanguardia*, October 12, 1937.

¹¹⁹ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 5.

¹²⁰ *La Vanguardia*, October 22, 1938; *La Vanguardia*, December 30, 1938.

¹²¹ *La Vanguardia*, January 14, 1938; Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 328-339.

violence. Not only did Spaniards fear Franco's militias and his allies, but also the many left-wing factions that divided the Republic. Communists, socialists, anarchists, democrats, and progressives bitterly fought one another for political power and influence, causing suspicion and leading to numerous arrests, denunciations, and executions as they refused to unite beneath a single banner.¹²² Combined, such conditions certainly painted a terrifying picture of the devastation of a war they would not win. *La Vanguardia*, however, painted a very different picture in its coverage. It praised a unified Republican front, a series of resounding military victories, and a strong sense of kinship with Madrid.

Theme One: A Unified Identity, "Catalonia is Spain"

To this day Spain remains a highly divided nation, encompassing seven official languages and fifty provinces. Officially unified during the *Reconquista* period in the fifteenth century, peripheral regions such as Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country have continuously resisted centralized power, seeking out greater autonomy (and independence) from Castilla y León.¹²³ To this effect, Catalonia has staged a number of revolts against the Spanish Government throughout the centuries, though its fight for independence today remains largely peaceful.¹²⁴ "The trouble with Barcelona," as a

¹²² Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 263-273; Christopher Ealham, "Anarchism and Illegality in Barcelona, 1931-7," *Contemporary European History* 4.2 (1995): 135-136.

¹²³ Stanley G. Payne, *Spain: A Unique History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 3-7, 72-80.

¹²⁴ Michael Eaude, *Catalonia: A Cultural History* (Luton, GB: Signal Books, 2011), 299-303.

Spanish statesman once argued, “is that once or twice in every century we have to send an army to besiege her from Castile.”¹²⁵ It is unsurprising, therefore, that Barcelona should be remembered as a leader of Catalan nationalism and the secessionist movements presently shaping Spanish politics.

In the case of the Spanish Civil War, however, Catalonia acted as one of the elected government’s greatest allies with Barcelona playing a major role in the conflict, politically and militarily. *La Vanguardia* made a point of emphasizing this friendship between Barcelona and Madrid, both highly symbolic capital cities in their respective regions that were historically at odds with one another. In fact, each edition dedicated an entire section of the paper to Madrid, its news, announcements, and events. On multiple occasions it asserted that Madrid embodied the true spirit of revolution, selflessly aiding the war effort and making enormous sacrifices. In an update on January 21, 1938:

Madrid is the archetype of this “normality” in the extraordinary. In Madrid one lives the war, one does not hide from it or push it away, but rather confronts it, crude and magnificent, in all its splendid and savage sincerity. Conscious of the danger, sure in its resistance, its fortitude energized to the utmost, but without its inhabitants or defenders becoming intoxicated by sensationalism or with artificial excitement.¹²⁶

By this point, those living in Madrid had witnessed the war firsthand. Air raids regularly stormed the city, supplies dwindled, the security of such prized relics as those situated in the Prado fell into uncertainty, and the lines back to Barcelona became increasingly

¹²⁵ Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *Barcelona: A Thousand Years of the City's Past* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 89.

¹²⁶ *La Vanguardia*, January 21, 1938.

difficult to navigate, as the fascists conquered more and more territory.¹²⁷ *La Vanguardia* clearly sympathized with Madrid, understanding that Barcelona would soon face similar challenges and that the fall of Madrid would spell certain disaster for the Republic. In a faded, mostly illegible, column from January 7, it argued: “War is difficult, comrade, distinguished artists. Madrid is truthfully a glorious and heroic city, thanks to the blood that has been spilled.”¹²⁸ The same day it featured an ironic illustration appearing to “sugar-coat” the conflict in Madrid, as if to poke fun at the often grandiose, embellished depictions of war.

The image, literally titled “The Sugar-coated Madrid,” features a crowd of people staring stoically into space behind a woman firing a canon.¹²⁹ In emphasizing war as a dirty business, *La Vanguardia* presented the Spanish Civil War as a necessary evil, a step to be taken on the way to the establishment of a kind of socialist utopia. The significance of this statement and accompanying illustration should not be overlooked. Though Franco led his first insurrection in Morocco and Andalusia in July 1936, proclaiming his manifesto from The Canary Islands the next morning, the Republic took over two months to militarize its forces officially. This was largely due to fierce public opposition and the government hesitancy to announce the imminency of a civil war. Socialists, communists, and anarchists alike tended to hold antiwar stances, and it was not until fascism proved a serious enough threat that they began to organize a strategic Republican defense. Moreover, early efforts

¹²⁷ Margaret Palmer and Garnett McCoy, “Letters from Spain 1936-1939,” *Archives of American Art Journal* 26, 2.3 (1986): 2-20.

¹²⁸ *La Vanguardia*, January 7, 1938.

¹²⁹ See Figure 2.1, “El dulcificado Madrid,” *La Vanguardia*, January 7, 1938.

to militarize lacked unity and central command, leading to various obstacles that critically delayed development.¹³⁰

La Vanguardia, portraying itself as the voice of a new and improved Spain, consequently attempted to assuage civilian fears, repeatedly urging readers to recognize that once the war ended, a lasting peace would be restored: “What we are seeing in Spain is simply the birth of a nation. Aside from the strength of democratic Spain, the noble Spain who defends herself, we understand that we Spaniards do not fight just for Spain: we dedicate our fight to the free peoples of the entire world, to democracy and to liberty.”¹³¹ In this way, *La Vanguardia* positioned the Republic as a largely peaceful force against the tyranny of fascism and Spain’s imperialist past at the hands of an abusive and decadent monarchy. It criticized the past exploitation of resources in the Americas and the Philippines and encouraged the development of an egalitarian Cuba. Republican Spain, it argued, occupied a unique place in European history and therefore had to succeed for the sake of freedom and democracy around the globe:

Pursuing the truth of the beautiful Spanish circumstance. Searching for the face of this war, in order to make it give up and recognize the immense falsehood of fascism. Getting involved in the war, as it is our Spanish core that suffers the ferocious assault...It [fascism] came cursing reason. It came dark and silent. Hungry for death. Thirsty for blood. Proud of its crown of madness. It believed the people to be asleep and to kill them while they slept. And so they cried: victory! They brought a murder of crows. (They did not foresee Madrid, Guadalajara, Pozoblanco, or Teruel.)¹³²

¹³⁰ Michael Alpert, *Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 103.

¹³¹ *La Vanguardia*, January 21, 1938.

¹³² Antonio Porras, “El sueño de la razón produce monstruos,” *La Vanguardia*, January 7, 1938.

The war, as framed by *La Vanguardia*, consequently became an unfortunate requirement for the survival of Spain's newfound liberties. In an especially dramatic article titled "The Sleep of Reason Creates Monsters," the periodical proclaimed the superiority of the Republic as rational and fair as opposed to the insane delinquency of dictators such as Hitler or Mussolini who could only operate by violent force:

Mussolini, Hitler, their legions that come to Spain, are nothing more than poor men at the service of a monster, whether they like it or not. The monster, their war, with his machines, has a robust and independent being that fiercely commands them; he is omnipotent to them, just like the cruel gods of ancient times: he cannot survive without victims...For this reason he must seek out wars and conflicts—Europe, Europe—for such is their inevitable fate...It matters not that this fate tries to disguise itself—like a shameful ulcer—behind pseudosciences and philosophies, such as racism...¹³³

Interestingly, this article's title came from a classic engraving by one of Spain's most celebrated artists, Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes (generally shortened to Goya), which he completed in 1799 (and continued to change over the course of the next decade) as a commentary on the brutish ignorance of Spanish institutions and society.¹³⁴ *La Vanguardia*'s readers, most of whom identified with the educated classes, would certainly have understood the piece as an allusion to the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the dreams of revolution suddenly crushed by a foreign despot.¹³⁵

Additionally, while the terms for Spain [España], Spanish [español/a], and Spaniard

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Sarah C. Schaefer, "Goya, The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters," *Khan Academy*, www.khanacademy.org/humanities/becoming-modern/romanticism/romanticism-in-spain/a/goia-the-sleep-of-reason-produces-monsters.

¹³⁵ Christopher Ealham, "Anarchism and Illegality in Barcelona, 1931-7," *Contemporary European History* 4.2 (1995): 134.

[español/es] abound, those referring to Catalan, Catalonia, and Catalonians are limited primarily to linguistic and regional associations. Rather than portray Spanish and Catalan, Spain and Catalonia, as opponents of one another, *La Vanguardia* reframed the region's controversial dual identity as harmoniously coexistent, representing a critical break with traditional perceptions of Catalan nationalism. The definition of Spain seemed to expand beyond the centralized notion of "Castilian" to include Basque, Andalusian, Galician, Asturian, and Catalan, transforming a historically controversial title into a kind of maternal symbol. Spain thus assumed the status of a threatened homeland begging the protection of all her children. Every edition dedicated columns to topics such as "the future of Spain," the "present situation in Spain," "the dilemma of Spain," "the friends of Spain," subsequently fostering a more inclusive and diverse national identity in which Madrid and Barcelona fought together as sister cities and not as distant, unrelated allies:

From this magnificent Madrid—which, twice in just over a century, has assumed leadership over the Hispanic peoples and transformed itself into a symbol of the fight for our independence against a foreign invasion...from this inimitable city, at once delicate and impenetrable, crucible where all the characteristics of the peoples and regions of our land are melded into one—I address the Spanish nation so as to lay before them, soldiers at the front and the workers at the rear guard, our confidence in triumph...and to explain, before all Spaniards, that the ends justify the means of our perseverance in the bloody fight toward victory which, though distant, is assured.¹³⁶

This article from June 1938 quotes Juan Negrín, the finance minister of the Second Spanish Republic, as he addresses the "Spanish Nation." Juan Negrín was a respected doctor and politician who hailed from a conservative middle-class family in the Canary Islands. He ascended the ranks to become the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido

¹³⁶ *La Vanguardia*, June 19, 1938.

Socialista Obrero Español), more popularly known as PSOE, and ultimately assumed the position of Finance Minister following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. He became Prime Minister of the Second Spanish Republic in May 1937, under the direction of President Manuel Azaña, an office he took with him into exile and held until his death in 1956.¹³⁷ His terminology here is key, as the term “nación española” was (and still is) only used by those in favor of collective integration. *La Vanguardia* similarly promoted the notion of Spain as a contrastive homeland, praised Negrín and his associates, and lobbied for a strong and cooperative state. Catalonia and Catalan identity are subsequently portrayed as comprising a core part of greater Spain and not as divided entities.

La Vanguardia thus attempted to consolidate Catalan and Spanish nationalism into a single, powerful force pitted against a foreign enemy commandeered by Italy and Germany. It should be noted, however, that not all Barcelona-based periodicals shared this view or interpretation of events. It appears that *La Vanguardia*, being a mainstream newspaper that proclaimed loyalty to the Republican state, expressed communist and soviet sympathies. This likely made it eager to downplay those nationalist sentiments pulsing throughout the region, instead hoping to encourage a unified society whose only opponent was class difference. As one American socialist observed: “This spirit of nationalism has no place in a workers’ world, of course.”¹³⁸ For this reason, some scholars have classified *La Vanguardia* as a conservative publication, as Barcelona was such a radical place in the

¹³⁷ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 146, 412-413; Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 923.

¹³⁸ Lois Orrs in Gerd-Rainer Horn, “The Language of Symbols and the Barriers of Language: Foreigners’ Perceptions of Social Revolution (Barcelona 1936-1937),” *History Workshop* 29 (1990): 57.

1930s that even soviet communism fell to the right of the influential anarchist philosophies which challenged Republican politics.¹³⁹

While *La Vanguardia* actively framed Spanish nationalism as a unifying force against Franco and the rise of fascism in accordance with communist ideals, however, it promoted democracy above all other forms of government. The newspaper likely downplayed local nationalist movements with the hope of both celebrating and encouraging cooperation between the Republic's two most important cities: Barcelona and Madrid. Moreover, *La Vanguardia* still sought to recruit foreign aid from Britain and the United States, democratic powers it regularly praised. It would have been in Spain's best interest, therefore, to communicate the war as a "battle of ideologies" between Spain and the Axis Powers, fascism and democracy, justice and injustice, without revealing the truth behind the devastating fragmentation of the Republican base.

The month of July proved an especially fiery month as this frame, which characterized the conflict in terms of a foreign invader threatening a unified democratic Spain, became dominant in *La Vanguardia*'s coverage. On July 12, the front page divided its headlines between "the war against the foreign invasion" and "the raids of the Italo-German air force."¹⁴⁰ On July 17, *La Vanguardia* argued against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (then known as Abyssinia), writing "Fight, Abyssinia. Spain defends herself heroically. China awakes from a thousand-year dream. Totalitarianism shall not succeed in dominating us. But the western democracies, oh!, they have not yet realized that we—the

¹³⁹ Christopher Ealham, "Anarchism and Illegality in Barcelona, 1931-7," *Contemporary European History* 4.2 (1995): 133-151.

¹⁴⁰ *La Vanguardia*, July 12, 1938.

Abyssinians, the Spaniards, and the Chinese—are fighting for them!”¹⁴¹ Though China and Ethiopia were not fighting in the name of democracy, per say, they were fighting against the expansionist policies of Japan and Italy, respectively, both of whom were members of the Axis powers formed in 1936. As *La Vanguardia* perceived the Spanish Civil War to extend beyond national borders into the international realm, it portrayed all three countries—Spain, China, and Abyssinia—as simultaneously resisting the imperialist aggressions of the fascist alliance.

On Christmas Day, 1938, *La Vanguardia* printed the speech delivered by Negrín in which he pleaded for Republican perseverance and for the lives of those soldiers captured by Franco. “Nothing overcomes Spaniards in the fight for their country!,” the headline boasted.¹⁴² By the end of January 1939 the express union between Madrid and Barcelona had become so strong that *La Vanguardia* boldly printed “the love for our land melds us into one destiny and one soul: Catalonia!...The enemy we face is neither Spanish nor Catalan...the defense of the Spanish Republic unites us.”¹⁴³ Not only did these words serve to establish Catalan identity as an integral part of the Spanish national makeup, but they also reinforced the concept of the enemy as an insidious invader threatening the nation from the outside. This feeds into the second theme of analysis in the international conflict frame discussed in the next section, as it drew a clear line between the “battered Spanish people” and their foreign oppressors. Furthermore, it elevated Barcelona to a symbolic place in global affairs as key to the future of world democracy.

¹⁴¹ *La Vanguardia*, July 17, 1938.

¹⁴² *La Vanguardia*, December 25, 1938.

¹⁴³ *La Vanguardia*, January 21, 1939

Theme Two: Barcelona's Place on the World Stage

As previously mentioned, at the time of the Spanish Civil War, Spain was a poor and undeveloped country that the rest of Europe considered backward, irrelevant, and even “oriental.”¹⁴⁴ After losing the last of its colonies in 1898 in the Spanish-American War, Spain officially lost its status as a world power. This gave Spain the likeness of a small and insignificant country undeserving of world attention.¹⁴⁵ As Payne has observed: “Spain is the only western European country for whom ‘decline’ became an obsessive theme, first for foreign writers and then for Spanish historians and commentators.”¹⁴⁶ And if Spain meant so little on a global scale, then the heart of Catalonia meant even less.

As a result, Barcelona found itself in a difficult position when war broke out. It had to convince Europe to take action in an impoverished foreign nation. It had to convince its own citizens that the efforts within the city walls equaled those beyond them. Above all, it had to convince the world that the fate of Spain *mattered*. *La Vanguardia* evidently understood this need, as it consistently published articles that warned of the insidious fascist threat creeping around the globe and elevated the Spanish struggle for democracy to the ultimate symbol of human freedom. For example, in October of 1938, *La Vanguardia* wrote: “A Wishful Soul Flies Over a Dying Liberty.” “Hitler has entered Czechoslovakia,”

¹⁴⁴ Elisa Martí-Lopez, *Borrowed Words: Translation, Imitation, and the Making of The Nineteenth-Century Novel in Spain* (London: Associated University Press, 2002), 47.

¹⁴⁵ Matthias Maass, “When Communication Fails: Spanish-American Crisis Diplomacy 1898,” *Amerikastudien / American Studies* 52.4 (2007): 491; Christoph Strosetzki, “1898 En la prensa española de 1908, 1918 y 1928,” *Iberoamericana* (2001-) 8.32 (2008): 51-60.

¹⁴⁶ Stanley G. Payne, *Spain: A Unique History* (Madison, US: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 128.

it declared, “to take possession of all that suits him. Now there is talk of doing away with the Munich Agreement. What is the point of slowing down the inevitable with vain formalities?...Here lived a nation [Great Britain] and it killed itself.”¹⁴⁷ In referencing the Nazi invasion of the Sudetenland, *La Vanguardia* criticized Western countries for ignoring Hitler’s advances and for being so slow to react to his abuses. The newspaper contended that fascism was not an isolated threat, but a growing sickness spreading across the continent and mistakenly unchecked by powerful rivals. It compared Spain’s position to that of Czechoslovakia: a nation unjustly robbed of its sovereignty. Moreover, it suggested that the campaign for fascism had only just begun and would continue to attack until forcefully challenged. In another article from the same day, it continued to emphasize this line of thought:

The problem is substantial. How can he [Chamberlain] be so disinterested in Spain, a Mediterranean nation and major peninsula in the Atlantic? How can he be so absent-minded toward a country of 24 million people, a country that borders Africa and whose coasts and islands control the fundamental maritime routes and passages of Europe to the point that they wrestle over colonies, protectorates, and mandates without even considering our vote?¹⁴⁸

La Vanguardia argued two major points in this publication: (1) Spain’s independence was being wrongfully threatened by a common enemy (fascism), and (2) Spain retained a strategic position in Europe with the potential to affect international trade and commerce if taken by Franco. Though strong throughout the war, this viewpoint developed into an especially notable theme toward the end of 1938. This frame likely operated with the end goal of encouraging public determination in the war effort by highlighting what

¹⁴⁷ *La Vanguardia*, October 9, 1938.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

distinguished it from other, less noble conflicts.

In addition to insisting that the war in Spain was relevant to the entire “free world,” reaffirming Spain’s lingering connections to strategic ports and maritime passages, and protesting the label of “civil war,” it also proclaimed the message of “revolution.” It highlighted the values and fundamental human rights that the Second Spanish Republic so ardently defended. The massive scale of revolutionary influence in the city of Barcelona cannot be overstated. In just a few years, the Second Spanish Republic had implemented a number of reforms that broke down many of the traditional power structures that had oppressed Spanish citizens for centuries. Contemporaries claimed that to be in Barcelona felt akin to “living the revolution firsthand.” Foreigners flocked to Catalonia to participate in a vibrant collective movement enveloped by “radical” liberalist ideas such as fair wages, gender equality, secular education, and social equality. According to one description: “What a city! It was just like a volcano, erupting in all directions at the same time. A breathtaking, awe-inspiring and heartwarming spectacle of noise, bustle, enthusiasm and gaiety. A revolutionary city in the full flood of revolutionary zest and zeal; an unforgettable sight.”¹⁴⁹ This statement was hardly unique, as thousands of travelers made similar observations. Perhaps the most famous account remains Orwell’s *Homage to Catalonia*, in which he described countless scenes of revolutionary fervor and political enthusiasm on behalf of Spaniards, Italians, Germans, Brits, and Americans alike. The atmosphere was evidently intoxicating to those who experienced it. *La Vanguardia*, at the heart of this discourse, would have certainly understood this incredible appeal and uniqueness better than anyone.

¹⁴⁹ Walter Gregory, *The Shallow Grave* (London: Gollancz, 1986), 26-27.

La Vanguardia clearly recognized the importance of communicating Barcelona's greater role and significance in the “war of the century.” It firmly established Spain’s position as embodying a sincerely democratic spirit akin to American and British ideals, and portrayed Catalonia as the “last stand” against the totalitarian policies of Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini. The daily framing of these characteristics throughout the war thus promoted Spain’s position in the global community of the 1930s, in addition to depicting Republican Spain as a real and solid ally to western nations at odds with the new ruling order sweeping across Europe. After all, Portugal had already fallen to fascist Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar in 1932 and Franco had stepped up his offensives on Madrid and Barcelona, the two cities vital to Republican survival, over the course of 1938.¹⁵⁰ By this point, Republican officials knew that the only hope of preserving Spanish democracy lay in foreign powers that still refused to mobilize.

Perhaps the most striking feature of this frame is the way the periodical seemed to reach out to a wider readership outside of Spain. Barcelona’s location so close to the French border was a constant source of news, soldiers, and resources. Though formidable to cross, travel over the Pyrenees was common, as it was one of the only viable ways to enter or leave the country.¹⁵¹ On multiple occasions, bold front-page articles appeared to speak directly to foreign audiences, even advising them on particular courses of action.

In an article from July 17, the headline read “Everything Has a Price”:

¹⁵⁰ Filipe de Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), 86, 191-194.

¹⁵¹ Gerd-Rainer Horn, “The Language of Symbols and the Barriers of Language: Foreigners’ Perceptions of Social Revolution (Barcelona 1936-1937),” *History Workshop* 29 (1990): 47; Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 160.

England rewards the repentant. But, what about the others who are free of guilt, the irreproachable, the virtuous? If it so happens that, in order to obtain the economic support of Great Britain, one must resort to blackmail, instigate a revolt, resurrect the practice of piracy, threaten war or not honor those international commitments voluntarily contracted, then all nations with failing budgets are going to feel themselves propelled to chaos. If a man of such clear intelligence in business as Mr. Chamberlain has not foreseen this, then he has not thought to look around him at the great lengths leaders will go to avoid delivering on their promises. A perfectly reasonable assumption nowadays.¹⁵²

The article went on to warn Britain not to trust Salazar, reminding Chamberlain of the parallels between a potential deal with Fascist Portugal and the already failed deals with Fascist Germany and Fascist Italy. It argued that Salazar had more to gain from an alliance with Hitler and Mussolini than with Chamberlain, making Portugal unreliable:

First, he wanted to buy Hitler, promising Lord Halifax a new “arrangement” of the economic regulations; he has thought about buying Franco a hundred times over if he should win the war; he offered everything and more to Mussolini for signing the “gentleman’s agreement”; now he dangles a tantalizing loan before Oliveira’s [Salazar’s] eyes. But for some reason or other, the truth is that he won’t get a single shilling.¹⁵³

The phrase used, translated in this context as “everything and more,” is actually “el oro y el moro,” a Spanish idiom referring to a historical event in which a Moorish *Alcalde* [governor] and his nephew were captured by Castilian bandits in the fifteenth century. According to the story, they demanded an exorbitant sum for their ransom which was promptly paid by the kingdom of Ronda. Upon receipt of the gold, however, the bandits released only the governor and insisted on keeping his nephew until another similar sum was received. Juan II of Castile eventually found himself forced to intervene, ordering the bandits to release the prisoner. Nonetheless, the incident spawned in Andalusia the popular

¹⁵² *La Vanguardia*, July 17, 1938.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

phrase: “quería quedarse con el oro y el moro” [he wanted to keep both the gold and the moor].¹⁵⁴ The use of this idiom, however common, was striking as it related so well to the context it described. It adeptly criticized the extortion of a foreign leader by a dishonest government.¹⁵⁵ Language carries within it the traces of a cultural heritage that helps to shape the collective identity of a group, and educated Spaniards would have instinctively picked up on the reference. As Edward T. Hall insists, “culture is communication” and “meanings must be found in the context of hundreds of years of history.” Indeed, this passage certainly illustrates his case that “the language of politics and the language of culture are a long way apart, yet each subsumes the other.”¹⁵⁶

La Vanguardia’s editor and writers would have known the likelihood of the paper’s dissemination in France and Britain, especially via the tens of thousands of foreigners passing through Barcelona, the vast majority of whom maintained a steady correspondence with friends and relatives abroad. Being the most prominent newspaper in the region, and furthermore, among the only mainstream sources to print almost exclusively in Spanish (instead of Catalan), *La Vanguardia* held the attention of readers in multiple cities,

¹⁵⁴ Antonio Gallardo, “El oro, el moro y los libros de sabiduría,” *Diario de Jerez* (November 14, 2010), http://www.diariodejerez.es/jerez/oro-moro-libros-sabiduria_0_423858024.html; J. N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516, Volume 2* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 300-317.

¹⁵⁵ Juan II of Castile was known to have hostile relations with Moorish leaders of al-Andalus, resulting in a number of skirmishes. On one occasion in 1432, he helped the Nasrid King Yusuf b. al-Mawl to usurp the throne of his adversary in Granada in return for which he demanded the signing of a humiliating and unpopular treaty. See Hugh Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 1996), 296-297.

¹⁵⁶ Edward T. Hall, *The Silent Language* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), 122.

including Madrid, Paris, London, and New York. Consequently, this subject merits further research into the circumstances surrounding *La Vanguardia*'s wartime publications, its geographic distribution, and the life of its especially elusive editor, María Luz Morales Godoy, the first woman ever to head a Spanish newspaper.¹⁵⁷ In the meantime, I must ask the following questions: did *La Vanguardia* seek first and foremost to convince locals of a false hope or did it intend to convert foreign readers to its cause? The answer, I believe, is both.

In an article from August 5 titled "Diplomacy and Resistance," *La Vanguardia* again criticized Britain and the United States for their lack of involvement, describing the Spanish Civil War as "this historic crisis of civilization." Moreover, it explicitly argued that Spain presently "suffers under the pressures of international diplomacy" and the deceptive "maneuvers" of foreign nations:

If the governments of the democratic powers had committed themselves to nonintervention, not so much as a policy but as a mechanism to prevent dangerous internal ideologies from gaining footholds, thereby evading their responsibilities and deferring to evasive compromises, the influence of the Spanish war would have tilted Europe decisively in favor of the Republic and defending freedom, law and peace. But in spite of such misplaced prudences and false alarms that have weakened our position, the Spanish a Republic is doing everything necessary to manifest its character and to leave its fingerprint on each day so that the Foreign Office, the Quay d'Orsay, the Palace of Venice, and the Willemstrasse can never untie themselves from us.¹⁵⁸

Criticism of the noninterventionist policies of France, Great Britain, and the United States became increasingly severe throughout the year of 1938. *La Vanguardia* portrayed the policy as being a thinly-veiled cover-up of their refusal to honor alliances. This denial of

¹⁵⁷ *La Vanguardia*, August 7, 1936.

¹⁵⁸ *La Vanguardia*, August 5, 1938.

the facts, it argued, could only be attributed to cowardice or delusion. It considered this negligence an insult to the democratic principles those countries claimed to uphold.

Throughout the month of August, the pleas for foreign intervention continued to intensify. The Battle of Ebro had begun in July, a battle launched, in part, to regain lost Republican territory in order to negotiate anew with France and Britain from a stronger, more powerful position.¹⁵⁹ On August 13, *La Vanguardia* printed the headline “Spain in the Close-Up,” in which it reported that French and British politicians had finally come to realize that “the neurological point of European tension was the war in Spain.” It ominously claimed that Hitler and Mussolini planned to further their “imperialist interests” and to destabilize the whole of Europe. *La Vanguardia* described the conflict as part of “an aggressive process” in which the world’s democracies must not shirk their proper duty to defend the legitimate Republican government. It stated that “Spain is an essential piece” in the battle for world domination, and so “the dictators will not relent because they cannot.”¹⁶⁰ Just a week later on August 21, *La Vanguardia* printed more to this effect in “Spain emerges as a symbol,” appealing yet again to British and American interests:

The democratic opinion of Europe has been moved once more by the voices of courage that come from the United States of America...The reason for this excitement is the insistence of the American president and his secretary of state in declaring that nations are united by an intricate network of economic interests and cultural relations which render the policy of isolation impossible. Therefore, international cooperation is required: both in peace for common prosperity and in war to defend freedom and the right of each of us to hold our own against the forces of chaos as embodied by assailing and undemocratic militarism.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 349.

¹⁶⁰ *La Vanguardia*, August 13, 1938.

¹⁶¹ *La Vanguardia*, August 21, 1938.

The violent militarist tendencies of Germany, Italy, and Japan came to dominate the papers. By September, the Falangists and their sympathizers were no longer referred to as Spaniards, but as “traitors,” “invaders,” and foreign mercenaries. This discourse classified Hitler as the supreme commander of totalitarianism with Mussolini as his hapless subordinate and Franco his dutiful servant. On several occasions, it called the three men “slaves” to the brutal ambitions driving them.

Throughout the fall of 1938 *La Vanguardia* continued to push Western democracies to action, criticizing their lack of resolve in the face of the obvious and immediate threat posed by the rise of fascism. In these months, it argued that Geneva must “confront two irreconcilable principles: that of law and that of violence.” It repeatedly compared Spain’s position to that of China, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Abyssinia—countries bullied by Fascist forces while democratic governments neglected their obligations. On multiple occasions, *La Vanguardia* suggested that this lack of action could only be interpreted as granting permission to the offending parties. It stated that Spaniards “need more effective assistance than rhetoric.” Moreover, it warned that if Europe remained in a perpetual state of “contemplative diplomacy,” then Hitler would “go on devouring nations for the supreme glory of the great German Reich,” eventually resulting in “the annihilation of civilization, that circle of culture, that which we call Europe.”¹⁶²

La Vanguardia tactfully sympathized with the rest of the continent in acknowledging that Spain did not suffer alone. “Europe witnesses dark times,” it wrote, “the forces of peace labor away in secret diplomatic meetings and ministerial assemblies. No one desires

¹⁶² *La Vanguardia*, September 9, 1938.

war, and they are right not to desire it.” At the same time, however, it reaffirmed that “France must be ready to honor her treaties and, above all, take up arms to stop the adversary that oppresses her,” and that England cannot “wash her hands of her ally.” It solemnly recalled the beginnings of World War I in 1914 and the “colossal” threat of “pangermanismo” [German nationalism], implying that another world war was inevitable.¹⁶³

October saw the publication of a particularly somber issue—Spain’s official farewell to the soldiers of the International Brigades. On two occasions, *La Vanguardia* dedicated moving elegies to the foreigners that had given up so much to fight alongside them. Many members of the International Brigades found themselves unable to return to their countries of origin due to government decrees that blacklisted them as undesirables, rabble-rousers, and communists. The United States, for example, which declared the act of lending any sort of military aid to Spain illegal, threatened to arrest them should they attempt to re-enter the country. Scores of German, Italian, and French volunteers would ultimately perish in concentration camps for their political dissidence. Generally speaking, not only did these recruits receive no thanks for their efforts abroad, but many of them also suffered harsh repercussions for their efforts. Additionally, at the time hundreds of international volunteers still languished in Spanish prisons for a variety of unsubstantiated charges, where they were denied due process until the end of the war, at which point they fell directly into the hands of fascist troops.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ *La Vanguardia*, September 13, 1938.

¹⁶⁴ Rob Stradling, “English-speaking Units of the International Brigades: War, Politics and Discipline,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 45.4 (2010): 744-767; Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin

On October 5, the newspaper announced the pending formal dismissal of the International Brigades to take place later that month. “Only we Spaniards shall remain,” it declared, “the International Brigades are leaving.”¹⁶⁵ On the official day of their departure, October 28, the headline read: “I tell you on behalf of the Spanish people that we do not promise, as is custom, to fight to the death. We promise to succeed: WE PROMISE TO WIN! Take home to your countries THAT WHICH YOU HAVE LEARNED HERE, that is, the MEANING OF UNITY.”¹⁶⁶ These words were taken from the speeches delivered by Republican leaders at a grand procession down the Diagonal in Barcelona. It is estimated that as many as 300,000 people lined the streets in attendance to honor their sacrifice.¹⁶⁷ It was on this occasion that La Pasionaria, the woman who coined the now-celebrated cry of “¡no pasarán!” [they shall not pass!], famously proclaimed:

Comrades of the International Brigades! Political reasons, reasons of state, the welfare of that cause for which you offered your blood with boundless generosity, are sending you back, some of you to your own countries and others to forced exile. You can go proudly. You are history. You are legend. You are the heroic example of democracy’s solidarity and universality. We shall not forget you and, when the olive tree of peace puts forth its leaves again, mingled with the laurels of the Spanish Republic’s victory, come back!¹⁶⁸

Books, 2006), 366, 419.

¹⁶⁵ *La Vanguardia*, October 5, 1938.

¹⁶⁶ The headline was bolded with some words appearing in all caps. The translation produced here follows the same formatting as the original. See *La Vanguardia*, October 28, 1938.

¹⁶⁷ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 366.

¹⁶⁸ Dolores Ibárruri (“La Pasionaria”) as translated by Thomas in Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 366; The transcript of the original speech is also available in Spanish. See “Discurso Pasionaria a Brigadistas 1 Noviembre 1938,” *Retóricas*,

Interestingly, this withdrawal occurred as they continued to wage the Battle of the Ebro, in which thousands of international recruits still served. The exact figure of Brigaders present in Barcelona at that time remains unknown, but the fact is they left behind at least 9,934 dead and 7,686 missing comrades.¹⁶⁹

Despite this farewell, the calls for international intervention continued to intensify so that the new year saw the distribution of articles all but begging for democratic support. The edition printed January 1, 1939, featured a bold front page dedicated entirely to the explicit realization of the Spanish Civil War as International Conflict frame. It referred to the speech delivered by Juan Negrín the previous evening. In it, “President Negrín addresses the United States: ‘the light can come from the west’” and “harshly criticizes the totalitarian maneuvers that threaten nations and human liberty.” At long last, he articulated “the true meaning of our superhuman fight.” Moreover, according to the newspaper, he did so in English:

Spain’s affairs are presently the world’s affairs, and what happens in our country is of such vital importance to the future that no one, in any part of it, should remain indifferent to the outcome. All countries and all peoples will feel the effects of the end result of this fight in Spain. Here, we shall determine if the relations between countries are to be carried out by brute force or by international law and mutual agreement; if we are to be divided up by imperialist dictators or governed by democratic governments; if “gangsterism” is to be accepted...or if democracy and liberty are to survive...this, above all, is the meaning, the true meaning of our superhuman fight in Spain.”¹⁷⁰

<http://www.retoricas.com/2009/06/discurso-pasionaria-brigadistas-1.html>; Paul Hoffman, “Dolores Ibárruri, ‘La Pasionaria’ Of Spanish Civil War, Dies at 93; An Indomitable Leftist,” *The New York Times* (November 13, 1989), <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/13/obituaries/dolores-ibarruri-la-pasionaria-spanish-civil-war-dies-93-indomitable-leftist.html>

¹⁶⁹ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 366.

¹⁷⁰ *La Vanguardia*, January 1, 1939

He argued that Spain was the “first bastion against totalitarianism” and that the military rebellion led by Franco serviced “extortion and piracy” so that “true Europeans turn their eyes toward the great American democracy” for aid. He poignantly warned that the “blindness” and denial exhibited by “neutral and ally nations” could ultimately prove devastating to human progress and civilization for generations to come.

La Vanguardia quoted heavily from the speeches delivered by Juan Negrín and other Republican deputies throughout the war in a consistently positive and encouraging light. In this way, *La Vanguardia* attempted to furnish government support and a unified public in order to promote the image of a strong and cohesive Spanish force. The age-old rivalries between Barcelona and Madrid, Catalan and Castilian, socialist and communist faded away in favor of a collective Spanish national identity. The newspaper brushed aside all rumors of disharmony and frustration. Instead, *La Vanguardia* described a brilliant and revolutionary Barcelona, a utopian city under siege by foreign invaders. Most importantly, it crafted a frame that portrayed the Spanish Civil War not as the result of a military insurgency contained by national borders, but as an international conflict of epic proportions.

This frame reveals how *La Vanguardia* interpreted the Spanish Civil War for contemporary readers, emphasizing an international, as opposed to national, conflict. It appealed to Western democracies for aid by highlighting their common values and interests and decrying the brutal policies of fascist regimes. The next chapter explores the second wartime frame composed by *La Vanguardia*, that of the Media as Guardian of Democracy frame, in which the newspaper assumed the voice of Spanish democracy.

MIRAR Y VER

El dulcificado Madrid



Figure 2.1 “El Dulcificado Madrid” [The Sugar-coated Madrid], *La Vanguardia*, January 7, 1938.

CHAPTER 3

THE MEDIA AS GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY FRAME

Introduction

La Vanguardia contributed to an interesting conception of the “idea of the report,” as first discussed by Carey, in clearly defining its “purpose” in a critical moment of world history. It not only voiced concern for covering contemporary events in order to keep the public informed, but also positioned itself as vital to the protection of Spanish democracy. This chapter examines *La Vanguardia*’s framing of the media as a guardian of democratic values in Spain. The frame is constructed via two predominant themes: (1) pleas for sustained and spirited resistance and (2) the announcement of exaggerated (sometimes fake) military victories to sustain the public’s hope. *La Vanguardia* thus encouraged citizen agency by citing the injustices of vilified opponents and by emphasizing the power of the individual, argued for fierce collective resistance in the face of defeat as part of what I have termed the “rhetoric of despair,” and criticized the oppressive tendencies of imperialism and autocracy. This analysis is divided into three sections. The first details the emergence of the frame in 1936-1937, while the following two sections discuss its evolution during the final year of the Spanish Civil War (1938-1939).

Emergence and Development

On September 10, 1936, *La Vanguardia* extended its masthead to include the title: *Diario al servicio de la democracia* [Newspaper at the Service of Democracy].¹⁷¹ This marked one of the earliest strategies to emphasize the media's role in the conflict as one of a popular voice defending democratic principles, rather than a biased or censored outlet manipulated by a totalitarian government. Additionally, it presented the Republic as a unified democracy while simultaneously downplaying perceived Marxist and communist sympathies.

La Vanguardia repeatedly stressed the Catalanian government's support of the armed forces and all citizens fighting for "libertad" [liberty], and provided detailed "reports" of the atrocities committed by fascist militias in the occupied territories, that is, public executions, conscription, mass graves, and air strikes, as illustrated by headlines like "The Fascist Terror in Asturias, Mass Executions in Covadonga."¹⁷² In March 1937, it printed the piece "Galicia, the martyr":

The string of brutal assassinations continues here in Galicia. They do not seem to weary of bloodshed. In my little Sada already 27 down; in La Coruña 1,600 and in Ferrol some 6,000...On December 20, they executed close to 500...Our martyred land, now bereft of Republicans of every shade...Galicia has no liberals left, aside from those that emigrated to America and the loyalist zone. To them we must look for the future of our homeland...¹⁷³

The article quoted Ramón Suárez Picallo, a Spanish Republican politician and leader of the Partido Galeguista [Galicianist Party] elected as the federal member of A Coruña in

¹⁷¹ See Figure 3.1, *La Vanguardia*, September 10, 1936.

¹⁷² *La Vanguardia*, January 1, 1938.

¹⁷³ *La Vanguardia*, March 3, 1937.

1936. Following the invasion of Galicia in July that same year, he was forced to flee to Barcelona and then to Buenos Aires, where he remained an ardent defender of Galician autonomy and culture until his death in 1964.¹⁷⁴

Galicia, the northwestern-most state of Spain bordering Portugal and the Spanish regions of Asturias and Castilla y León, was among the first territories conquered by Franco, likely because the general had a home-ground advantage. Franco, though descended from a distinguished Andalusian military family, had grown up in the city of Ferrol in the industrial province of A Coruña and attended the famous naval academy there.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, Galicia's Portuguese neighbors had already succumbed to fascism when Antonio de Oliveira Salazar solidified his power as totalitarian head of state in 1932. Salazar had closed the borders in support of Franco, severely crippling the mobilization of the Galician liberal resistance.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, it appears that the Falangists had managed covertly to activate a military uprising in various cells throughout the region. As reported in Suárez Picallo's letter, Republican allies and sympathizers subsequently found themselves eliminated at an alarming rate, leaving the region securely under fascist control within a few weeks. Divisional commanders, civil servants, and local mayors were promptly arrested and executed, their families imprisoned. Juana Capdevielle, the accomplished intellectual wife of A Coruña's civil governor Francisco Pérez Carballo was

¹⁷⁴ Elixio Villaverde García, "A forxa dun rebelde con causa: Ramón Suárez Picallo," *Grial* 31.117 (1993): 99-113.

¹⁷⁵ E. Moradiellos, *Francisco Franco: crónica de un caudillo casi olvidado* (Madrid: Digitalia, 2002), 25-27.

¹⁷⁶ Felipe de Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), 191-194.

even detained, raped, and murdered as a terrifying message to Republican loyalists.¹⁷⁷ Galicia, similarly to Catalonia, had cultivated a language and culture distinct from central Spain since ancient times, and the swift and brutal oppression of such “differences” likely served as a disquieting reminder to Catalonians everywhere that their Catalan culture, language and society would be similarly persecuted by Franco, especially should Barcelona, their proud and prosperous capital, ultimately fail.

On May 26, 1937, *La Vanguardia* printed an edition devoted almost entirely to the bombing of Guernica and “La Ciudad Universitaria.”¹⁷⁸ Comprised of only four pages and featuring no articles, it let the gruesome photos tell the story of Franco’s brutality, making it a unique issue. The caption at the center read:

Here lie the remains of Guernica, the city symbolizing Basque liberties, destroyed by the incendiary bombs of assorted squadrons of German planes. Barbaric show of an undeniable intervention, and of an attitude they call “defender of civilization.” In Guernica, this capital [...] of *Euzkadi*, only five houses have been left standing, but as an immortal and eternal symbol.¹⁷⁹

By incorporating the name “Euzkadi,” the Basque-language term for the Basque Country, *La Vanguardia* expressed a powerful and strategic solidarity with Republican allies in Northern Spain. A historic Basque capital, the destruction of Guernica, which left an estimated 300+ civilians dead, dealt a devastating blow to the region, terrifying their Catalan neighbors. Home to an ancient oak, under which the Basque *fueros*, or code of laws, were proclaimed according to a supposedly democratic tradition stretching back into

¹⁷⁷ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 74.

¹⁷⁸ *La Vanguardia*, May 26, 1937.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

legend, Guernica had long been upheld as an international symbol of Republican values and regional autonomy.¹⁸⁰ By the twentieth century it was considered a minor and defenseless settlement, but its utter destruction shocked the Western world, a fact immortalized by Picasso's classic painting.¹⁸¹

Perhaps with this unusual, strikingly visual elegy, *La Vanguardia* hoped to mobilize readers and prepare Barcelona for the inevitable and fast-approaching "Batalla de Cataluña" [Battle of Catalonia]. As Valocchi argues, "the key to framing is finding evocative cultural symbols that resonate with potential constituents and are capable of motivating them to collective actions," and indeed, it is difficult to find a village of greater cultural significance than Guernica.¹⁸² Moreover, by "reducing the war to a photograph," this issue helped to strengthen *La Vanguardia*'s existing collective action frames. According to Zelizer: "journalism's images of war provide a strategically narrowed way of visualizing the battlefield...Journalism's images force the public to see war but in a way that only partly reflects the war being depicted."¹⁸³ *La Vanguardia* also worked to sustain the Republic via generous monetary contributions, which it publicly announced on its front pages. Such declarations served to show dedication to the cause and to maintain public

¹⁸⁰ Wm. T. Strong, "The Fueros of Northern Spain," *Political Science Quarterly* 8.2 (June 1893): 325-330.

¹⁸¹ P. Woodworth, "Gernika: Democracy, Bombs, and Paradoxes," *Explaining Modern History, Volume 3: Basque Country: A Cultural History* (Luton: Signal Books, 2006), 89-91.

¹⁸² Stephen Valocchi, "Collective Action Frames in the Gay Liberation Movement, 1963-1973," *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, Ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 54.

¹⁸³ Barbie Zelizer "When war is reduced to a photograph," *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*. London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 130.

opinion of the paper as a democratic voice, in addition to providing much-needed funds: “Since August 31, the personnel of the editorial, administrative, studio, and distribution offices of *La Vanguardia* (worker cooperative) have donated from their own salaries to the anti-fascist militias the amount of 30,149 *pesetas*.”¹⁸⁴ Strategically published on New Year’s Day in 1937, it fortified *La Vanguardia*’s position as a Republican periodical directly involved in the survival of Spanish democracy, and encouraged public confidence in the war effort for the coming year.

In the opening weeks of the war, *La Vanguardia* did not present it as a war at all. Rather, it described “isolated factions” attacking random cities and dismissed rumors of their advancement, assuring readers that the Republic was already in the process of regaining recent losses. Writers encouraged citizens to return to their normal routines and to uphold Barcelona as a strong and functional metropolis of the Republic. Though by October of that same year it had changed its tune, by then describing it as the “war of the century,” it continued to emphasize the role of the working citizen as an active agent who could secure the future of a nation. Furthermore, not only did this frame persist as the war progressed, but it even escalated to the point of citizens being explicitly declared the only determinant agents in battle, the Republican government and media being reduced to nothing without them, as evidenced by the January 25, 1936, front-page article cited at the beginning of this thesis.

Scholars have suggested that media portrayals valuing the average voter as critical and beneficial to the democratic process encourage political involvement within

¹⁸⁴ *La Vanguardia*, January 1, 1937.

communities, thus fostering greater electoral participation.¹⁸⁵ Perhaps this concept could also be extended, in some respects, to *La Vanguardia*'s wartime strategies. While no elections were held between 1936 and 1939, the Republic clearly worked hard to maintain its reputation as a veritable democracy fighting for the rights of the Spanish people, specifically the working classes which had made its existence possible in the first place.¹⁸⁶

Unlike contemporary American news media sources that have reflected a tendency in recent years to downplay the role of individual voters and, in some cases, even portrayed their actions as "harmful," *La Vanguardia* promoted the function of Barcelona's citizenry, proclaiming them instrumental to the resistance and promoting their civic engagement in every facet of the war effort.¹⁸⁷ The paper published routine announcements detailing where and when to mail packages to loved ones on the front and what to send them, places to meet and mobilize, and what hospitals to visit should residents become ill or injured.

In this way, the periodical presented each and every citizen as someone capable of making a difference in the outcome of the conflict, crediting *Barceloneses* as the driving force behind Republican triumphs and resilience to adversity. Even Barcelona's children were considered valuable to the cause and critical to the future of the Republic. *La Vanguardia* encouraged donations in the form of games, toys, food, and clothing, and

¹⁸⁵ S. E. Jarvis and S. Han, "From an Honored Value to a Harmful Choice: How Presidential Candidates Have Discussed Electoral Participation (1948-2012)," *American Behavioral Scientist* (2013): 1653.

¹⁸⁶ R. V. García, "The Failure of Electoral Modernization: The Elections of May 1936 in Granada," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44.3 (2009): 401.

¹⁸⁷ S. E. Jarvis and S. Han, "From an Honored Value to a Harmful Choice: How Presidential Candidates Have Discussed Electoral Participation (1948-2012)," *American Behavioral Scientist* (2013): 1652-1653.

dedicated weeks to “the child,” in which parents were told to instill in their children genuine revolutionary spirit and enthusiasm for the “heroic battle” against fascism and inequality:

Remember the children!...One must explain to the children, at home and at school, the significance of our civil war... and above all, awaken and brighten their faith in the future, with an organization of society that is more equal, more just, and more humane, in which the health and happiness of all will be valued.¹⁸⁸

Such articles reiterated the Republican commitment to the construction of a new and egalitarian Spain that would offer better prospects to future generations. After all, the promises that drove the Second Spanish Republic since its inception included universal education, equal opportunity, the elimination of rigid class differences, and other matters which progressives held to be fundamental human rights.

According to *La Vanguardia*’s historic example, then, the media may possibly be used as a tool by which to cultivate a space in which individuals can interact, come together as a community, and effectively battle injustice: “As Hart, Jarvis, and colleagues have shown, it is often the case that political keywords are at the crossroads of change and stability where certain elite voices promote them and other elite voices challenge them.”¹⁸⁹ In other words, this master frame may be classified as “motivational” in nature, as it “attempts to give people a reason to join collective action.” Studies have demonstrated that identification of the “problem” is not usually enough to move individuals to action.¹⁹⁰ In other words, such frames serve to “trigger” collective movements and persuade targeted

¹⁸⁸ *La Vanguardia*, January 3, 1937.

¹⁸⁹ S. E. Jarvis and S. Han, “From an Honored Value to a Harmful Choice: How Presidential Candidates Have Discussed Electoral Participation (1948-2012),” *American Behavioral Scientist* (2013): 1652-1653.

¹⁹⁰ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 6.

groups.

This master frame effectively encompassed the three major components central to the construction of collective action frames: identity, agency, and injustice. It clearly specified a persecuted group (Spanish Democracy), and drew a clear line between the “we” (Spain’s “loyal” citizens) and the “them” (Franco and his supporters).¹⁹¹ This frame was constructed of two predominant themes: pleas for sustained and spirited resistance and the announcement of exaggerated (sometimes fake) military victories to sustain the public’s hope. In so doing, *La Vanguardia* encouraged citizen agency by citing the injustices of vilified opponents and by emphasizing the power of the individual, argued for fierce collective resistance in the face of defeat as part of what I have termed the “rhetoric of despair,” and criticized the oppressive tendencies of imperialism and autocracy.

Theme One: Pleas for Resistance

June of 1938 witnessed yet another deadly blow to liberal Barcelona and the Republic when France again closed its borders to Spain and refused to deal arms to the Popular Army. In February they had officially lost the Battle of Teruel followed by the defeat of Vinaroz (Vinaròs in Catalán), a seaside town in Valencia, effectively splitting the Republican zone in two. To make matters worse, Republicans continued to lose key territories in the Basque country up north, giving Franco the opportunity to launch his attacks on Catalonia from multiple directions.¹⁹² Yet *La Vanguardia* downplayed the

¹⁹¹ Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 6.

¹⁹² Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 237-238, 313-327.

alarming setbacks, rarely mentioning them by name, and instead used the front pages to advocate for “tenacity,” “hope,” and “optimism.” On June 19, it featured the following headline in the form of a quote from Negrín:

So long as we still have a corner of our land left, so long as a single Spanish heart still beats, so long as the future of our country hangs in the balance, we may give in or we may vanquish. And we shall vanquish... Victory depends upon our tenacity and it is worth every sacrifice. Resistance was, and still is, the open way to victory.¹⁹³

The paper went on to condemn potential faithlessness on behalf of the Spanish public as the “greatest evil,” reciting still more portions of Negrín’s excessively hopeful speech:

The lack of confidence in our people, the lack of faith in triumph, the lack of enthusiasm for the greatness of our cause, drags us to the verge of catastrophe... Neither in life nor in war can one triumph without faith. Faith creates and overcomes. Success cannot be possible if one contemplates defeat and prepares to surrender before the fight.¹⁹⁴

In this way, *La Vanguardia* performed a kind of rhetoric of despair, in which its writers refused to concede the reality of their situation. Instead, they masqueraded their despondency as enthusiasm with exuberant language and extreme optimism. Headlines did not describe military losses but military “victories,” many of which, at this point, were either fictional or exaggerated. For example, *La Vanguardia* never admitted defeat in the Basque country even when signaling mass evacuations of the region. Instead, it focused on the many generous efforts made by the city’s citizens to welcome refugees and look after displaced or orphaned children. To this effect, it posted bilingual ads in Spanish and Catalan informing the public to look after their “brothers and sisters” and praising their heroic fight against the “Fascist invaders.” It also began to place greater emphasis on the

¹⁹³ “La voz del gobierno,” *La Vanguardia*, June 19, 1938.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

role of children in Catalonia. It encouraged Barcelona's youths to "join the cause," called upon parents to educate their families on the importance of the revolution, and discussed the war in terms of a justified fight for a better future for all Spaniards regardless of class or ethnicity.

Such appeals likely served as an attempt to re-energize its base, as Spain's 1930 revolution was built upon the radical promises of the redistribution of land and wealth, the eradication of an abusive Church and its institutions, the creation of an egalitarian democracy in which men and women could vote, and universal education. Additionally, the Second Spanish Republic celebrated the elevation of traditionally marginalized regions, their unique cultures and languages.¹⁹⁵ *La Vanguardia* repeatedly listed the "reasons for the war," as if to reemphasize their central importance, and explicitly proclaimed the importance of sustained courage and resistance in the face of fascism. As a prized example of such fortitude, multiple articles emerged celebrating Menorca, a Catalan-speaking island off the eastern coast of Spain. On June 30, it went so far as to publish a sensational biopic titled "Menorca, the indomitable" in which it heralded the island's success in holding off Italian forces for over two years despite relentless air raids. It even described Menorca as "the island of death" in regard to the encroachment of fascism: "Menorca, the garden of the Mediterranean, has been one of the many surprises of this war without precedent in world history...to the only island free from the tyranny of the lictors' beam."¹⁹⁶

La Vanguardia consistently referred to Mussolini as a kind of escort to Hitler,

¹⁹⁵ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 21-23.

¹⁹⁶ *La Vanguardia*, June 30, 1938.

framing him as a subservient bodyguard to Germany and the Nationalists. In using the term “lictor,” *La Vanguardia* recalled the practice in Ancient Rome of dictators and powerful nobles being accompanied by select plebes in order to avoid bodily harm.¹⁹⁷ Menorca had, in fact, put up an impressive defense, making Franco rethink his attacks on a seemingly vulnerable island he had planned to conquer in a matter of days. Its successful resistance, however, was largely made possible by its unfettered ties to Catalonia and Valencia and the access to arms and supplies they provided. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Menorca ultimately surrendered less than a month after the fall of Barcelona in early 1939.¹⁹⁸

As Catalonians began to lose sight of the victory that the Republic continued to proclaim “imminent,” *La Vanguardia* published increasingly passionate articles decrying the fatal crime it named a “lack of faith.”¹⁹⁹ It began to assert that Republican values would certainly triumph even if the fight looked long and brutal. In one such piece titled “The Power of Heroism and Resistance,” it concluded that “a lesson learned in the Spanish Resistance is that energy produces efficiency.”²⁰⁰ On another occasion it argued that a “war is not won or lost until the final battle.”²⁰¹ Most of these articles accompanied proclamations of Republican advances, the swift “punishment” of enemy combatants, and the valuable information obtained from various “desperate” and “disillusioned” prisoners

¹⁹⁷ “Lictor: Ancient Rome,” *Livius*, <http://www.livius.org/articles/concept/lictor/>

¹⁹⁸ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 385.

¹⁹⁹ *La Vanguardia*, June 19, 1938.

²⁰⁰ *La Vanguardia*, July 24, 1938.

²⁰¹ *La Vanguardia*, July 5, 1938.

of war (and occasionally, defectors). Moreover, it continued to give the impression that world powers regularly convened to revise the nonintervention policies they had stipulated at the outset of the conflict. It even blamed the standing Republican Government of 1936 for its “negligence,” accusing its officials of failing to advocate better for the “cause” abroad in order to recruit international aid.²⁰² This type of coverage was deliberately misleading, as no such meetings were taking place, or at least, not with the level of intensity or influence presumed.

On March 15, 1938, the headline contained the famous Catalan phrase: “Ara és l’hora, catalans!”²⁰³ Literally translated to mean “now is the time, Catalonians,” the phrase has long-standing associations with the region’s nationalist movement. Its exact origins remain uncertain, but it is the official chant for the National Day of Catalonia celebrated annually on September 11 to honor those fallen heroes who defended Barcelona against Philip V in the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1715). The siege, which began in 1713 and lasted fourteen months, resulted in the loss of Catalan liberties, institutions, and laws. Today, it is remembered as a symbol of the Catalan struggle for independence.²⁰⁴ In this case, however, the phrase called for Catalanian resistance against Spain’s fascist invaders.

It began by acknowledging that “the war that was far away, so far away from Catalonia” finally crept up on them by way of Aragon (a Catalan-speaking state sharing

²⁰² *La Vanguardia*, July 24, 1938.

²⁰³ *La Vanguardia*, March 15, 1938.

²⁰⁴ Horst Pietschmann, “Barcelona, Catalonia and the Crown of Aragón in the Bourbon Spanish Empire,” *European Review* 25.1 (2016): 61-62; Pere Anguera, “El 11 de septiembre: Orígenes y consolidación de la Diada,” *Ayer* 51 (2003): 17-38.

Catalonia's western border):²⁰⁵ "It seems as if the sky is falling...In the city there is a nervousness that is logical up to a point, but its rationale is by no means acceptable." It asserted that the people of Madrid, or *Madriileños*, also felt anxious when the war first breached their walls, because "the cruel reality overcame the most apathetic of temperaments; but it [Madrid] shook and shuddered; cast aside its distinctive calm and began to burn with anger, with rage, with self-denial, with violent passion." It subsequently called for a similarly effective resistance to that seen in Madrid, reminding Catalonians just what was at stake. Interestingly, though the article was written in Spanish, it placed a great deal of emphasis on the value of the Catalan language:

Do Catalonians understand what the triumph of the hordes presently advancing through Aragon would mean? Nothing more than this: suppression of all Catalan newspapers, disappearance of all books and texts written in Catalan from our shops, bookstores, public and private libraries; persecution of our striped flag; abolishment of radio broadcasts delivered in Catalan.²⁰⁶

The "striped flag" referred, of course, to the *Senyera*, or Catalan national banner. The design, supposedly derived from the coat of arms of the Crown of Aragon, represents the communities of Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. It consists of four red stripes atop a gold background and its usage dates back to the twelfth century. Its mysterious origins are steeped in legend and the flag has long been regarded as an important cultural symbol of Catalan pride.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Historically, Catalonia made up part of the medieval Kingdom of Aragon. See Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 5; Donald J. Kagay, "The Treason of Center and Periphery: The Uncertain Contest of Government and Individual in the Medieval Crown of Aragon," *Mediterranean Studies* 12 (2003): 19-21.

²⁰⁶ *La Vanguardia*, March 15, 1938.

²⁰⁷ Victor M. Olivieri, "Sub-state nationalism in Spain: primers and triggers of

The article then adopted a strikingly nationalist tone that spoke directly to Catalonians: “we speak of the purely Catalan because we address the Catalonians.” *La Vanguardia* subsequently stirred up the core sentiments of Catalan nationalism in order to promote regional resistance. It argued that the Second Spanish Republic fought for the preservation of democracy throughout the whole of Spain, and that Franco threatened still other values. The Catalonians must persevere for the sake of their unique language and culture: “What we mean to say is this: Now is the time, Catalonians—in the words of our nation’s hymn—now is the time to be alert...The character of Catalonia is in dispute like never before in our history. Her fate rests in the hands of all her children...” Such rallying cries to protect the homeland highlighted that the Republic fought to defend Spain, while the fascists fought to conquer Spain. Moreover, they contributed to the regional political discourse of the era, which may be defined as “a system of communicative practices that are integrally related to wider social and political practices, and that help to construct specific frameworks of thinking.”²⁰⁸

At one point *La Vanguardia* even featured a cartoon with the slogan “it’s better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.”²⁰⁹ The caption, while reminiscent of other revolutions, recalls the words of Mexico’s Emiliano Zapata in his fight against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz in 1910. *La Vanguardia* had covered the Mexican Revolution

identity politics in Catalonia and the Basque Country,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38.9 (2015): 1615; *Flag of Catalonia*, <http://www.spain-flag.eu/region-flags-spain/catalonia.html>.

²⁰⁸ Myra Macdonald, *Exploring Media Discourse* (Chatham: Arnold, 2003), 10.

²⁰⁹ See Figure 3.2, Luis Bagaría, “La actualidad de una frase,” *La Vanguardia*, April 10, 1938.

extensively following its outbreak and the Spanish Republic still celebrated the ideals proclaimed by the Mexican Revolution (as most of them were similar to those proclaimed during the revolution in Spain). By the 1930s Zapata was considered a hero of the common man, especially for his most famous statement: “Quiero morir siendo esclavo de los principios, no de los hombres [I wish to die as a slave to principles, not to men].”²¹⁰

In this way, *La Vanguardia* kept alive the Spanish Revolution of 1930, the progressive reforms instigated by the popularly elected government of the Republic, and the Catalanian thirst for regional autonomy and recognition as a rich cultural center of Spain. The War for Spanish Independence, as it was frequently called, thus became the ultimate battle “¡por la vida! [for life!],” “por tierra y libertad [for land and liberty],” and for the future and well-being of Spain’s most oppressed populations.²¹¹ *La Vanguardia* never let its readers forget the horrifying consequences of a Republican defeat. It constantly reminded them that resistance was their only option. In one such article it argued that “We have no choice, Spaniards: we cannot opt out. It is impossible. We stand between death and victory. And victory can only be obtained by means of resistance. We must resist, we must defend...” It then quoted the acclaimed verses of Bernardo López García’s “Oda al Dos de Mayo [Ode to May 2],” originally written to honor the Spanish rebellion against the French occupation that sparked the Peninsular Wars (1808-1814): “one cannot enslave a nation that knows how to die.”²¹² Such calls for resistance often alluded to historical

²¹⁰ Stuart Easterling, *The Mexican Revolution: A Short History, 1910-1920* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 51-61.

²¹¹ *La Vanguardia*, April 10, 1938; *La Vanguardia*, April 15, 1938.

²¹² *La Vanguardia*, April 7, 1938.

precedent, whether it was the War of Spanish Succession or the Napoleonic invasion. It subsequently cultivated a sense of “collective memory” of the long-standing Spanish tradition of defiance to foreign domination and centralized power. As yet another article patriotically proclaimed, “the world shall learn, once again, what the Spanish people are capable of.”

Throughout the year it upped the stakes still further. The loss of Spanish democracy, it argued, would spell disaster for other democracies. The governments of France, Britain, and the United States would inevitably collapse. “The Spanish example,” as it was termed, was meant to ensure that the world’s democracies did not “die a terrible death.”²¹³ As one article reaffirmed that December (1938), “Catalonia, throughout the course of its history, has invariably been the bastion of liberty and law.”²¹⁴ In building upon the historical tradition of Catalan resistance to centralized power, *La Vanguardia* emphasized the devastating consequences of a Republican defeat.

On December 30, the newspaper dedicated nearly an entire page to a speech delivered by Lluís Companys to the “Catalan troops of the rearguard.”²¹⁵ In it he encouraged sustained resistance, urging readers to remember that “you are an important factor in the victory.” He argued that the protection of all parts of Catalonia (not just Barcelona) was vital to the outcome as “every inch of soil in Catalonia is like a piece of the Catalan soul.” A Fascist conquest would result in the loss of Catalan autonomy, for “Catalonia would be persecuted. Our songs, our language, our sweet memories, our soul,

²¹³ *La Vanguardia*, April 12, 1938.

²¹⁴ *La Vanguardia*, December 30, 1938.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

everything we are now, what we were in the past, what we could be in the future.” He called for “all Catalans to defend our esteemed land!” and insisted: “I do not ask what you think of it. I ask if you are Catalan and I point out to you the imperative of duty.” In brief, this speech, which *La Vanguardia* described as “words of encouragement, of stimulus, and of hope to the Catalan soldiers,” prompted citizens to resist the approaching enemy “for Catalonia, for the Republic, and...for Liberty.”²¹⁶

Lluís Companys began his career as a lawyer in Barcelona. Involved in leftist politics since his university days, he was elected President of Catalonia in 1933. Although he eventually became a fierce supporter of the Second Spanish Republic during the war, his relationship with the Republican administration was always rocky at best. In fact, in October of 1934 he had even staged a coup d'état in which he ousted several elected members from their government positions and attempted to force the adoption of Catalan Nationalist policies. The act was deemed traitorous to the Republic and he was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. Upon the declaration of the Spanish Civil War, however, the government pardoned him and permitted him to continue in his office as leader of Catalonia. He fled to France with his family in 1939 after the fall of Barcelona but was extradited to Madrid by Nazi officials. Franco sentenced him to execution by firing squad for treason in 1940.²¹⁷

In January of 1939, the final month of Republican resistance in Barcelona, the tone

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Paul Preston, “Great statesman or unscrupulous opportunist?: Anglo-Saxon Interpretations of Lluís Companys,” *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* (2015): 1-17; Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 105, 413.

of the newspaper became feverish and frenzied. By January 15, an estimated one-third of Catalonia had surrendered to fascist occupation as the Nationalist Armies marched onward to Barcelona. The majority of international soldiers had been withdrawn from active duty and the Republic could not recover from its devastating losses in the Battle of the Ebro.²¹⁸ On January 8, Ángel Ossorio penned an article titled “The Failure of Logic” in which he appeared to downplay the role of reason.²¹⁹ His argument was striking for the fact that Republicans generally boasted that their superior ideals were guided by rational thought while those of the fascist enemy were motivated by greed, medieval practices, and irrational interests. He began by quoting the Austrian writer, Stefan Zweig: “The heroic is always irrational and illogical and whenever a man or a nation undertake a mission that surpasses their real measure, their energies amount to a greater power they never thought possible.” He continued: “Logically, Spain, attacked by so many nations, betrayed by others and abandoned by almost everyone, should have perished from consumption long ago. Yet far from perishing, she has rebuilt the machinery of the State, begotten a grand army, and established in wartime industries she never achieved in times of peace and quiet. What purpose has logic served? None.” In this way, Ossorio did not simply cast away reason, he rejected it outright, arguing that it served no “purpose.” He described the tide of the war as belonging to a greater destiny, as something beyond the comprehension of mankind. “Divine providence?,” he asked, “Impetus of fate? Mere coincidence? Think whatever you like, but we all harbor the conviction that our destiny rises far above the laws

²¹⁸ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 430.

²¹⁹ *La Vanguardia*, January 8, 1939.

of logic.” He closed his argument with the words: “I surrender. I’d rather not go back to speculating about the war in Spain. With respect to that, I’ll just close my eyes, declare myself a disciple of the University of Cervera, and recant the ‘disastrous mania of thinking.’”

The University of Cervera, originally constructed in 1717 to reward the city for its support of Philip V in the War of Spanish Succession (as well as to punish the rest of Catalonia for its alliance with the Hapsburgs) was a prominent institution that closed its doors permanently in 1835.²²⁰ The “funesta manía de pensar” refers to the famous words supposedly delivered by the University’s rector during the royal visit of Fernando VII in the early nineteenth century, at which point he stated “nothing is further from our intention, your majesty, than the disastrous mania of thinking.” Though the precise words of the encounter have been heavily disputed by scholars, they form part of a popular cultural story in Spain and the quote is still frequently cited.²²¹

Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo was a distinguished Spanish intellectual of his time. The self-proclaimed “Christian, conservative, and attorney” had served under Alfonso XIII, Miguel Primo de Rivera, and the Second Spanish Republic in various capacities as statesman, minister, and lawyer. He authored a number of influential works, one of which

²²⁰ Mordechai Feingold and Victor Navarro-Brotons, *Universities and Science in the Early Modern Period* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 275; Robert Hughes, *Barcelona* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 186-189.

²²¹ Robert Hughes, *Barcelona* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 188; Manuel Ángel Santana Turégano, “Las universidades canarias y la funesta manía de pensar,” *El Día* (November 16, 2004), <http://web.eldia.es/cultura/2004-11-16/9-universidades-canarias-funesta-mania-pensar.htm>; Guillermo Fatás, “‘Lejos de nosotros la funesta manía de pensar,’ nunca lo dijo la Universidad de Cervera,” *20 Minutos* (November 9, 2016), <http://www.20minutos.es/opiniones/guillermo-fatas-tribuna-frases-celebres-lejos-de-nosotros-la-funesta-mania-de-pensar-nunca-lo-dijo-la-universidad-cervera-2883238/>

detailed the history of Catalan political thought in the late eighteenth century. Despite his conservative views and his displeasure with the anticlerical policies legislated by the Republican government, he emerged as an outspoken proponent of Spanish democracy so that he was once famously described as “a monarchist without a king.” Additionally, his passion for rationalism and justice over the course of his illustrious career earned him the reputation of “Pope of jurisprudence.” As a close personal friend of Prime Minister Manuel Azaña²²² and long-time resident of Barcelona, he faithfully served as an expert on the political and cultural challenges afoot in Catalonia.²²³

Throughout the war, *La Vanguardia* at once praised and pleaded for Spanish resistance to the fascist insurgents. Every citizen was made out to be significant and essential to a Republican victory. Even as battles were waged and lost, territories conquered, and tens of thousands of refugees forced to flee their homes, *La Vanguardia* stood behind the popularly elected government in declaring that sustained resistance could

²²² Manuel Azaña served as the democratically elected deputy of the Second Spanish Republic from 1931-1933 and 1936-1939 (he alternated among the positions of Prime Minister, President, and Minister throughout his career). A prolific journal writer, his account of the inner workings of the government before and during the Spanish Civil War is now considered “el texto memorial más importante de la historia española moderna” [the most important memorial text in modern Spanish history]. See Manuel Azaña, *Obras Completas IV: Memorias Políticas y de Guerra* (Madrid: Ediciones Giner, 1990), vii-xiv.

²²³ “Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, católico republicano y abogado de Azaña” S. G. Madrid, http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-24-12-2008/abc/Cultura/angel-ossorio-y-gallardo-catolico-republicano-y-abogado-de-aza%C3%B1a_912078072314.html#; Julio M. Lázaro, “75º Aniversario de la II República: Descendientes de Ossorio y Gallardo reclaman los bienes confiscados al político republicano,” *El País*, http://elpais.com/diario/2006/04/14/espana/1144965612_850215.html; Patricia Zambrana Moral and Antonio M. López García, “Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo. Sus proyectos políticos, con prólogo de Pedro C. González Cuevas,” *Revista de estudios histórico-jurídicos* 33 (2011): 719-721.

still save Catalonia, Spain, and all of Europe. By January 1939, Barcelona's situation had become desperate. It was cut off from the major supply lines of the Republic and denied vital foreign assistance from supposed allies as Catalonia fell piece by piece to the fascist threat. Despite this, *La Vanguardia* continued to publish inspiring (if outlandish) articles referring to the "magnificent Spanish resistance" of soldiers and civilians alike.²²⁴ By the end, these pleas for resistance against all odds demonstrated the "failure of reason" writers like Ángel Ossorio so passionately defended.

Theme Two: False Republican Advances and Victories

La Vanguardia reported a great deal on Republican victories and advances throughout the civil war, fulfilling a number of important functions: first, it kept Barcelona's citizens informed of the war's progress and relevant current affairs; second, it helped to rekindle the people's hope in the midst of a dark moment in their nation's history; third, it inspired faith and confidence in the elected leaders of the Republic; and fourth, it emboldened quotidian resistance to rebel insurgents. This sort of reporting is unsurprising in light of the war's pivotal role in the daily lives of Spaniards, all of whom were immediately impacted in a variety of ways. Many had lost their homes, others had bid farewell to loved ones sent to the front, and rich and poor alike were literally starving. In Barcelona and Madrid, Spain's two major Republican cities, the affliction of hunger was particularly severe and would endure for years after the war's conclusion in a period now famously remembered as "los años de hambre" [the years of hunger], in which an estimated

²²⁴ *La Vanguardia*, January 5, 1939.

200,000 people died of starvation.²²⁵

Of special interest, however, is how this theme evolved over the course of events. *La Vanguardia* never fully admitted to the crushing losses suffered by Republican forces at the height of the war, downplayed the significance of fascist victories, denied rumors of growing disunity within their ranks and Spain's liberal coalitions, and outright lied about the impossibility of their defeat even up to the day before Barcelona's official surrender. Instead, reporters framed Republican military campaigns as highly efficient and organized, government officials as responsible and diligent, and the "fight for liberty" as heroic, effective, and unified on all fronts, despite the fact that most evidence suggested otherwise: "The Sacred Union of the Anti-Fascist Front: Discipline, Unity of action, Professional Army, Singular Command."²²⁶ In late 1936, when it became apparent that the Spanish National Army posed an imminent threat to the survival of Spanish democracy that could not be ignored, *La Vanguardia* began regularly publishing articles detailing Republican military achievements such as that which appeared on November 25, 1936: "The enemy keeps pushing, without success, on the Central sectors. The fascist factions, in their impotence, fire at several Madrid settlements without making a single hit. Our troops, in a vigorous advance toward Pinto, have harshly punished the rebels."²²⁷

Still, in mid 1937, months after the devastation of Guernica and the unrelenting

²²⁵ M. Richards, "Constructing the Nationalist State: Self Sufficiency and Regeneration in the Early Franco Years," *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 160-161.

²²⁶ *La Vanguardia*, February 18, 1937.

²²⁷ Michael Alpert, *Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59.

assaults on major Basque cities, *La Vanguardia* maintained they had not lost the north to the fascists. In a government message addressing the Spanish public printed on June 22, 1937, the headline read: “Bilbao has been evacuated. But Euzkadi has not been defeated.”²²⁸ A blatant lie, Barcelona’s readers must have been skeptical. For the citizens of Bilbao, the largest city in the Basque country and a major industrial center, to be forcibly removed from their homes would have certainly appeared grim to onlookers, yet *La Vanguardia* refused to admit defeat. Rather, over the coming year as Catalonia came directly under siege, the newspaper continued to proclaim the Republic as the war’s indisputable victor despite the thousands of refugees entering Barcelona following the destruction of nearby cities and villages. Even on January 3, 1939, less than a month before Barcelona’s total collapse, *La Vanguardia* featured the following article on its front page: “The Spanish soldiers continue dealing enormous blows to the invading armies.”²²⁹

It is not difficult to imagine why *La Vanguardia* worked so hard to deceive readers about the reality of the Republican war effort. Some might call its writers unethical, dishonest, or even delusional, but none of the original reporters or editors survive to account for their actions or explain their motivations. Upon their defeat, a few were executed, others imprisoned, and most barred from ever working again in Spanish media. Their director spent forty days in prison and received a lifetime ban from the press.²³⁰

²²⁸ *La Vanguardia*, June 22, 1937.

²²⁹ *La Vanguardia*, January 3, 1939.

²³⁰ C. V. Lage, “María Luz Morales: Unha das primeiras mulleres que dirixen un medio de comunicación,” *Consello da Cultura Galega na rede*, <http://culturagalega.gal/album/detalle.php?id=144>.

When asked to comment on her experience, she only replied “los tiempos de guerra no dejaron recuerdos, sino heridas” [“the war did not leave memories, so much as wounds”], and refused to elaborate further.²³¹

According to Storr, “Whether a belief is considered to be a delusion or not depends partly upon the intensity with which it is defended, and partly upon the numbers of people subscribing to it.”²³² Perhaps they still believed that they could win over the hearts and minds of Barcelona’s suffering citizens, a cultured and liberal people, and win the war, even if only in part, by convincing them of the fortitude of democratic ideals. Or perhaps they simply believed it was the right thing to do, echoing the sentiments of Salamanca’s celebrated Miguel de Unamuno, a Basque professor dismissed from his post by the Falangists in 1936 for his bold opposition to Franco: “If it is nothingness that awaits us, let us make an injustice of it; let us fight against destiny, even though without hope of victory; let us fight against it quixotically.”²³³ Either way, this theme appears to constitute an important aspect of collective action frames: that of the “prognostic” frame by way of its presentation of a solution to those problems proposed in the “diagnostic” frame.²³⁴

²³¹ P. Obelleira, “En memoria de la “gran señora de prensa y la escritura,” *El País* (2010), http://elpais.com/diario/2010/03/21/galicia/1269170297_850215.html.

²³² Anthony Storr in Lawrie Reznick, “Introduction: Delusions About Delusions,” *Delusions and the Madness of the Masses* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), xi-xxvi.

²³³ Miguel de Unamuno, *Tragic Sense of Life*, Trans. J.E. Crawford Flitch (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2007), 268.

²³⁴ As mass communication framing theorists Snow, Benford, Johnston, and Noakes point out, “collective action frames offer strategic interpretations of issues with the intention of mobilizing people to act.” Snow and Benford identify three core framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing essentially presents a diagnosis of the perceived problem. Prognostic framing proposes a solution to the stated

La Vanguardia openly supported the Republican armies, daily celebrating their supposed victories and advances. It never attempted a neutral voice in the conflict. Rather, it cultivated a highly personal and emotional style that enthusiastically embraced the newfound democratic freedoms of the Spanish Republic. By 1938, the newspaper even included notes in the margins outright praising the government forces and their supreme resolve. *La Vanguardia* expressed absolute trust in its generals and soldiers. To evidence this unmistakable stand it asserted at the start of the new year: “*La Vanguardia* initiates its work in this year of 1938 wishing for great prosperity for our readers and for a decisive victory by the Republican Army to secure the liberty and independence of Spain.”²³⁵

Moreover, it emphatically dismissed any rumors of schism or conflict within the Republican administration: “No, there is no political crisis, there is no crisis of government...because that would certainly be a tremendous accusation.”²³⁶ It suggested that such rumors derived from a lack of responsibility and a “repulsive frivolity,” for surely it would be against their interests to concern themselves with the specific “interests of this or that party, this or that organization, this or that family.” After all, the Republican Government’s primary objective was “to save the Republic, to protect Spain as a free, independent, and dignified nation.” By supporting the Republican government and military

problem. Motivational framing gives people a reason or an incentive to join collective action. All three components provide the foundations of collective action frames. See Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 5-6; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 615-617.

²³⁵ *La Vanguardia*, January 1, 1938.

²³⁶ *La Vanguardia*, February 25, 1938.

so thoroughly in both coverage and tone, the newspaper established itself as the “true” voice of democratic values and communicated to readers that it favored their interests above all else in the fight against foreign tyrants.

A cartoon by Luis Bagaría published the same day similarly emphasized the rise of a new and stronger Spain. Titled “The New Year,” it depicts a baby hatching from an egg, a laurel of victory in his extended hand. The sun shines brilliantly in the background while small, frowning toads look upon him in despair. The caption below reads “Hurrah! The toads can do nothing against the Republic!”²³⁷ Bagaría was a prominent political caricaturist who drew a series of cartoons in Spanish newspapers throughout the war, a number of which appeared in *La Vanguardia*. Ironically, he once gave a lecture in Bilbao in which he asserted: “The majority of humorists are sad men; true humor is not the flower of youth, it is the product of prolonged pain, the pain of having been born, the conviction of our ridiculous smallness, the feeling of having lost faith in the beyond and to have to feel die within oneself the ideal of the redemption of the human race...humor is a flower born of pessimism.”²³⁸

The surrounding articles described the enormous victories in Teruel. “All attempts to infiltrate the stronghold have been totally rebuffed,” one headline claimed, “we have also rebuffed all attacks undertaken by the enemy on the rest of the front.”²³⁹ In late February, *La Vanguardia* continued to celebrate advances in the Battle of Teruel with

²³⁷ See Figure 3.3, Luis Bagaría, “Año Nuevo,” *La Vanguardia*, January 1, 1938.

²³⁸ Antonio Elorza, *Luis Bagaría: el humor y la política* (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1988), 140-142.

²³⁹ *La Vanguardia*, January 1, 1938.

statements such as “our success dealt a terrible blow to the adversary,” “the ups and downs of the developing operations there produce a positive result,” and “we conquered the fortified city within a week.” The newspaper attributed such victories to the possession of “an army not only animated by a spirit and enthusiasm that in the first months allowed it to face a superior enemy, but also endowed it with the necessary conditions to undertake successfully the riskiest and most difficult enterprises from the point of view of military technique.”²⁴⁰ In one article from February 22 (the final day of the battle), it wrote “a glorious day for the Republican Air Force; before Teruel they viciously fight.”²⁴¹ It went on to describe the events on the Eastern front: “Today, in the difficult defense of Teruel for the positions surrounding the stronghold taken by the enemy, there were episodes of extraordinary heroism, as they have maintained intact the lines of defense set by the command.”

While *La Vanguardia* appeared to admit defeat in Teruel the following day, it did not actually change its tune:

The mass offensive of artillery and aviation executed by Germany and Italy in the service of Franco, has proved superior to the resistance accumulated by our army in Teruel. That is the plain fact which explains the evacuation of this stronghold. As a result of our troops taking it and desperately counterattacking the rebels, the Government is proud to emphasize the significance of the operation, but also warns that whatever the final results of the Battle of Teruel, the main tactical goal, which was to foil an attack on Madrid, has been achieved.²⁴²

The newspaper thus reconstructed the crushing loss as a victory. The armies may have been

²⁴⁰ *La Vanguardia*, February 27, 1938.

²⁴¹ *La Vanguardia*, February 22, 1938.

²⁴² *La Vanguardia*, February 23, 1938.

forced ultimately to surrender Teruel, it argued, but they managed to save Madrid from yet another vicious attack in the process. It was this, all along, that was the primary objective of the operation. It then announced the battle's conclusion, stating that "it is no longer worthwhile to continue the fight in Teruel, even though our forces know heroically how to counter the effective tactics of the enemy." In this way, *La Vanguardia* repeatedly extolled the extreme skill, bravery, and competency of the Republican armed forces, thereby promoting public faith in a favorable outcome.

The Battle of Teruel, so named for the capital city of a poor Aragonese province where the majority of fighting took place, marked a decisive turning point in the Spanish Civil War. It began in late 1937 and lasted almost exactly two months during the most brutal Spanish winter in decades, forcing soldiers to labor in conditions that "were almost Siberian."²⁴³ Located at a high elevation in a mountainous region bordering the Pyrenees some 3,000 feet above sea level, Teruel records the lowest annual temperatures in Spain. Its relative isolation from neighboring territories has made it a valuable fortress city since the days of the Moorish occupation. The battle started as a Republican offensive to regain control of the northern provinces that had fallen earlier that year. Although a fairly minor settlement, Teruel had recently been rebranded a symbol of Nationalist power in Aragon, and the Republican Army sought to recapture their lost regional strongholds in the northeast. Additionally, according to scholars, rumors circulated that Franco planned to launch another aviation assault on Madrid on December 18 and so the Republic hoped to distract him with a preemptive strike on December 15. Initially bold and successful,

²⁴³ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 316.

Republican forces did alarm their opponents as they managed to breach the city walls and push back the fascist lines. However, they were severely outnumbered in manpower and weaponry. Franco, who did not lack such resources, was able to concentrate his tanks and artillery on the Levante Front, resulting in staggering losses for the Republic. The defeat at Teruel is widely regarded as the battle that cost them the war.²⁴⁴

This trend continued throughout the year as the chances of an already elusive victory completely withered away. As late as October *La Vanguardia* published the following headline about the Battle of the Ebro: “Our positions improve south of Venta de Camposines: The enemy has suffered many setbacks and has lost four fighter planes and a two-engine plane, Spanish troops make an important advance in the Toledo sector.”²⁴⁵ The Battle of the Ebro, now solemnly described as “una huella imborrable de la Guerra Civil” [an unforgettable wound of the Civil War],²⁴⁶ was the longest and bloodiest battle of the war. It spanned nearly five months and claimed the lives of over 100,000 people.²⁴⁷ The battle was widely regarded as a disaster for the Republic, as it cost them enormous amounts of soldiers and supplies and ultimately did little to impede the advancement of Nationalist troops. Its conclusion marked the beginning stages of the Catalan Offensive that winter. Moreover, it had become apparent by October that the Republicans were not advancing, as

²⁴⁴ Donald J. Kagay, “Two Towns Where There Was Once One: The ‘Aldea’ in Medieval Aragon,” *Mediterranean Studies* 6 (1996): 29-38.

²⁴⁵ *La Vanguardia*, October 9, 1938.

²⁴⁶ Archivo ABC, *La Batalla del Ebro: una huella imborrable de la Guerra Civil*, http://www.abc.es/fotos-abc/20120724/batalla-ebro-huella-imborrable_103051.html

²⁴⁷ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 358.

they claimed, but retreating. In redrawing serious setbacks as improvements, *La Vanguardia* boldly lied to readers. It appeared to believe that the truth would dishearten its audience and weaken the resistance, so it reacted by promoting hope and enthusiasm, painting a picture of certain victory much like a light beyond a tunnel of darkness.

The Battle of the Ebro officially ended on November 16, 1938.²⁴⁸ The following day, *La Vanguardia* wrote: “The Government makes public the real score of the glorious operation in the Ebro”:

The Republican government does not forsake its well-known Spanish virtue of calling things by their proper name...In war, when objectives are met, commanders have the right to express delight...The diversion has cost the enemy 80,000 losses, 200 planes, and an enormous sum of material. We have also experienced substantial losses, much less than our adversary, but with them we have gained four months of organization and resistance and we have cleared the Levante Front.²⁴⁹

Such lies were likely apparent to readers located in Barcelona who witnessed the influx of thousands of refugees from elsewhere in Catalonia and the Basque Country. However, Republican forces were effective in limiting communication between soldiers on the front and their friends and families back home. Letters were intercepted and soldiers on leave were frequently arrested upon their return before they had the chance to discuss their experiences with civilians.²⁵⁰

Interestingly, *La Vanguardia* never sugar-coated the brutality of war or glorified

²⁴⁸ International Brigade Memorial Trust, *The Ebro Offensive*, <http://www.international-brigades.org.uk/content/ebro-offensive>; Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 349-362.

²⁴⁹ *La Vanguardia*, November 17, 1938.

²⁵⁰ Rob Stradling, “English-speaking Units of the International Brigades: War, Politics and Discipline,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 45.4 (2010): 745-766

the bloodshed. It certainly praised the fallen and their great sacrifices, but it never celebrated the violence. In fact, it regularly condemned traditional notions of war as being full of pride and wonder. It thought of war as imperialistic and domineering, much like Franco. The war Republicans fought, it argued, was a defensive one to preserve Spanish culture and values, to protect the working classes and their new-found democratic liberties. In this way, *La Vanguardia* continued to assert Manuel Azaña's 1936 plea to Spaniards that they uphold the "legitimate power of the nation...for the reestablishment of justice, liberty, the validity of the Constitution, and the Republican spirit."²⁵¹

The Media as Guardian of Democracy Frame fortified *La Vanguardia's* position as a genuine voice for the Second Spanish Republic in the fight against Fascism. It thus framed the free press as integral to the survival of democratic ideals in Spain. The next chapter analyzes how *La Vanguardia's* wartime framing spoke not only to the contemporary locals it sought to recruit but also to a revolutionary future.

²⁵¹ Manuel Azaña, *Memorias políticas y de guerra, II* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1978), 19.



Figure 3.1 *La Vanguardia*'s masthead from September 10, 1936-January 25, 1939.

The translation reads "*La Vanguardia*: Newspaper at the Service of Democracy."



Figure 3.2 "La actualidad de una frase" [The Timeliness of an Expression] by Luis Bagaría in *La Vanguardia*, April 10, 1938. The caption beneath it reads "Better to die on your feet than to live on your knees."




Figure 3.3 “Año Nuevo” [New Year] by Luís Bagaría in *La Vanguardia*, January 1, 1938. The caption reads “Hurrah! The toads can do nothing against the Republic.”

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Barcelona finally surrendered to Franco's forces on January 26, 1939. It was the first time in years that the press fell uniformly silent.²⁵² The next day, *La Vanguardia* reappeared with a new message and suspended leadership.²⁵³ "Barcelona for the indomitable Spain of Franco!," it proclaimed. "Today, *La Vanguardia* renews its publication, recovering, at long last, the rhythm it lost two and a half years ago."²⁵⁴ *La Vanguardia* no longer operated in "the service of democracy." Instead the masthead read, *Diario al servicio de España y del Generalísimo Franco [Newspaper in the service of Spain and the Great General Franco]*. It declared itself "liberated" by the "inherent heroism of Franco and the savior National Army," and expressed an "ardent desire to serve Spain, the immortal Spain, the eternal Spain." Most strikingly, it concluded: "For now, we erase the past...we stand at attention, as one more soldier, to do your bidding. Long live

²⁵² Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 379.

²⁵³ *La Vanguardia*'s editor received a life-time ban from the press and suffered incarceration in the months following Barcelona's defeat. This was also the case for the newspaper's most prominent writers and administrative staff. See Chapter 3, p. 73-74.

²⁵⁴ *La Vanguardia*, January 27, 1939.

Spain! Onward, Spain! Long Live the Great General Franco!”²⁵⁵ Subsequent editions were titled *La Vanguardia Española* [*The Spanish Vanguard*], effectively erasing any lingering public connection to the Catalan culture and identity it once promoted.

The fall of Barcelona spelled the fall of the Second Spanish Republic. Madrid, deprived of its most powerful ally-city, eventually succumbed to Franco on April 1, 1939, officially ending the Spanish Civil War. Under the new Fascist leadership, most Barcelona-based newspapers closed down, but *La Vanguardia* was maintained, likely because of its perceived local influence and wide readership. As Robert E. Park once stated, “The power of the press may be roughly measured by the number of people who read it.”²⁵⁶ It is not a stretch, therefore, to assume that Franco found it worthwhile to redefine the newspaper’s mission rather than destroy it entirely.

The Second Spanish Republic (1931-1939) demonstrated a radical break with Spanish society and institutions. The suppressed voices and ideas that had been brutally silenced by conventional power structures finally erupted in an almost unstoppable flood of novelty and enthusiasm. Barcelona’s *La Vanguardia* was among the voices that reflected a desire for profound change and for a new and modern Spain not shackled to the oppressive traditions of the past. As Antonio Machado, one of Spain’s most illustrious poets of the twentieth century, wrote for *La Vanguardia* in March of 1938:

If we consider the ideal reversibility of the past and the plasticity of the future, there is no trouble converting history into a novel without losing any of the essentials. Only in this way can we shake the tyranny of the anecdotal and circumstantial. We do not believe there is sufficient reason to accept the fatalism of the past. We

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Robert E. Park, “The Natural History of the Newspaper,” *American Journal of Sociology* 29.3 (November 1923): 274.

realize, however, that the Determinists have never conceded that the past could have been otherwise, or even that there could be many versions. Because they do not allow for freedom of the future and so with double the force they must also deny it to the past.²⁵⁷

Machado, a literary giant and political activist of the Spanish left, had penned a classic poem just a few years earlier detailing this concept of “the two Spains” which had occupied Spanish political discourse for well over a century: “There is a Spaniard who wants/ to live and so he begins to live/ between a Spain that dies/ and another Spain that sighs/ Little Spaniard now coming into the world/ may God protect you./ One of the two Spains/ is about to freeze your heart.”²⁵⁸ Interestingly, his own family demonstrated this split, as his brother (also a distinguished writer) sided with the Nationalists in 1936.²⁵⁹ Mariano José de Larra, another poet, had expressed a similar idea exactly one hundred earlier when he wrote of a nightmarish stroll through the cemetery that contained Spain’s tombstone. “Here lies half of Spain,” it read, “the other half killed it.”²⁶⁰

Machado’s article expressed the same idea that had appeared in *La Vanguardia* on a daily basis. Machado maintained that the Spanish Civil War marked a battle between

²⁵⁷ Antonio Machado, “Notas inactuales, a la manera de Juan de Mairena,” *La Vanguardia*, March 27, 1938.

²⁵⁸ Antonio Machado “Españolito que vienes al mundo,” *Campos de Castilla* (RinconCastellano e-Books), 83.
http://www.espacioebook.com/sigloxx_98/machado/machado_camposdecastilla.pdf.

²⁵⁹ Xavier Rius Xirgu, “Los hermanos Machado,”
<http://margaritaxirgu.es/castellano/vivencia/31machad/machadoc.htm>; Manuel Machado, “Francisco Franco,” *Poesía de la Guerra Civil española 1936-1939*, Ed. César de Vicente Hernando (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 1994, 2007), 226.

²⁶⁰ Mariano José de Larra, *Obras completas de D. Mariano José de Larra (Fígaro)* (Barcelona: Montaner y Simon, 1886), 536-539; Mariano José de Larra, “El día de difuntos de 1836,” *Fígaro en el cementerio* (Biblioteca Virtual Universal, 2006),
<http://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/130078.pdf>.

autocracy and democracy and between foreign adversaries and the legitimate state government, but he also defined the conflict as part of the endless struggle between old and new, past and future, tradition and innovation. As Foucault points out, when enough time has passed, established power structures assume the status of “natural” and “inherent” in the style of divine right, religious authority, or class distinctions:

Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs. These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question... They must not be rejected definitely of course, but the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized.²⁶¹

Franco’s message was essentially one of recreating Spain’s “glorious” history in the modern era so as to “make Spain great again.” *La Vanguardia*, meanwhile, called for the creation of a radically different society that better served the general population. A major clash occurred when part of the country sought refuge in a fixed past while the other aspired to a moldable future. As Manuel Azaña asked himself in 1932, “The thrill of history and the natural combine. From this, could a new history arise?”²⁶²

Even in the darkest of times, *La Vanguardia* refused to admit defeat not because it was so foolish or delusional, but because the cost of defeat was so devastating. As Nathan Crick argues, “For if to be human means anything, it means to assert one’s character even in the face of catastrophe, confident in the knowledge that no life is a catastrophe that has

²⁶¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 25.

²⁶² Manuel Azaña, *Obras Completas IV: Memorias Políticas y de Guerra* (Madrid: Ediciones Giner, 1990), 356.

a place within a composed tale of meanings.”²⁶³ For decades, Spaniards suffered under a dictatorship that enforced “tradition” at the cost of civil liberties. Despite Franco’s victory, however, the Second Spanish Republic and its advocates had left an indelible mark on the future course of Spain. Immediately following his death in 1975, Spaniards reinstated a democratic government that has since survived two military coups. The nationalist movements of Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country have resurged in full force. The Catholic Church, once the ultimate authority, has been relegated to a position of relatively little influence. Education and other institutions have undergone radical reforms. Indeed, it seems Miguel de Unamuno, the acclaimed philosopher and academic who served as rector of the University of Salamanca, was correct when he told Franco’s representatives that “you will win because you have more than enough brute force, but you will not convince. To convince you must persuade and to persuade you must have what you lack: reason and right in the struggle.”²⁶⁴ These words destroyed Unamuno’s career in 1936, but they are now celebrated as the foundation of democratic ideals in Spain.

The frames composed by *La Vanguardia* emerged at the beginning of the war in 1936, but became especially articulate and profound over the course of 1938. In essence, *La Vanguardia* asserted that Spain had fallen victim to Spanish traitors and greedy foreigners who sought to overthrow the legitimate government. It declared in no uncertain

²⁶³ Nathan Crick, “Rhetoric and Events,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 47.3 (2014): 271.

²⁶⁴ Martin Nozick, “History and Eternity,” *Miguel de Unamuno* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1971), 122; Gustavo Adolfo Ordoño, “Unamuno versus Millán Astray, el célebre incidente en el paraninfo de Salamanca,” *Pax Augusta* (2013), <http://www.paxaugusta.es/2013/05/unamuno-versus-millan-astray-el-celebre.html>.

terms that the loss of the Republic meant the loss of human progress and civilization. The “Battle for Spain,” *La Vanguardia* argued, was the battle for the world. In this way, the two frames analyzed in this thesis, though distinct, underwent similar transformations in the final year of the war. Both intensified until they seemed frenzied and feverish as the end drew near. There are several possible explanations for this. First, as framing theorists have stated, frames tend to become more conscious and developed over time. Second, by nature frames are not fixed or stable but are always evolving to stay relevant. Third, as Crick and Rhodes suggest, “eloquence arises out of a confrontation with death.”²⁶⁵

Crick and Rhodes wrote their article “Eloquence and Death” in reference to the individual forced to confront his own mortality, but I believe this idea can also extend to groups and collective identities. After all, they pose that “at the root of eloquence is the power to begin anew—and to achieve immortality—despite the knowledge that our actual lives must end.”²⁶⁶ *La Vanguardia* explicitly sought to “begin anew,” *especially* in the face of death. The growing prospect of defeat proved stimulating rather than stifling. The newspaper became more, not less, articulate as the war progressed. Framing theory provided me with a lens through which to see this evolution of thought as the themes and ideas dominating its coverage sharpened in desperation.

The task of the historian to uncover the past that is all but lost to us is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the discovery and analysis of such discourses lends insight into the present-day structures and systems we take for granted. On the other, it reinforces

²⁶⁵ Nathan Crick and Joseph Rhodes, “Death and Eloquence,” *Rhetoric Review* 33.4 (2014): 327.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

the sense that we are prone to make the same mistakes. The Spanish Civil War ended seventy-eight years ago, yet we see similar discourses emerging to address today's crises. In the United States, for example, the political parties remain divided as to whether the solution lies in "tradition" or in "progress." A similar debate has taken hold of Spain, in which no single party has been able to gain a decisive majority for several consecutive elections.

Consequently, Foucault's quest "to free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence" remains as relevant today as when he first conceived of it in 1972.²⁶⁷ "We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption," as discourse does not reflect the reality of the world, but the human perception of that reality which is constantly in flux.²⁶⁸ If anything, the case of *La Vanguardia* demonstrates that political discourse, though malleable, is unstoppable. The distinctive voices that contribute to it rise and fall along with the power structures that represent them. They can be silenced for a time, but they tend to reemerge as societies transform to address an ever-changing world. Franco may have succeeded in stomping out Spanish democracy during his lifetime, but he failed to reestablish Spain's autocratic institutions in the long run. As Foucault articulates best of all: "Discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, you will not be reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but don't imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live

²⁶⁷ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 203.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

longer than he.”²⁶⁹

Collective action frames are unique for the fact that they tend to emerge in moments of change and power shifts. Consequently, the qualitative study of such frames also involves the study of rhetoric, though some will dispute this claim. Rhetoric, in its most basic form, refers to “the strategic use of communication, oral or written, to achieve specifiable goals...it is employed only when words can make a difference.”²⁷⁰ Kuypers has argued extensively that news framing analysis can (and should) be viewed from a rhetorical perspective, as news writers use rhetoric in the construction of frames.²⁷¹ As mass communication framing theorists Snow and Benford, and Johnston and Noakes also point out, “collective action frames offer strategic interpretations of issues with the intention of mobilizing people to act.” Snow and Benford identify three core framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing presents a diagnosis of the perceived problem. Prognostic framing proposes a solution to the stated problem. Motivational framing gives people a reason or an incentive to join collective action. All three components provide the foundations of collective action frames and all three were present in *La Vanguardia*’s wartime coverage in the attempt to inspire resistance in a losing cause.²⁷²

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 211.

²⁷⁰ Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective,” *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Ed. Paul D’Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers (New York: Routledge, 2010), 288.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 288-289.

²⁷² Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 5-6; Robert

Some have posed that the extreme optimism present in Republican propaganda resulted in a sense of over-confidence on behalf of the public that led to defeat, but no studies confirm or even correlate such assertions. However, it appears that in recent years a strong distrust of the “liberal media” persists in democratic societies that may affect contemporary interpretations of an activist press. Kuypers, for example, fiercely maintains that “an activist press is a danger to democratic society.”²⁷³ He contends that “the press has distinctly moved away from its perceived tradition of objective news reporting, placing one foot within the realm of social responsibility and one foot within the realm of social activism,” thus “manipulating politics.”²⁷⁴ In selectively reducing the scope of information delivered in news coverage, he claims, the media undermine the democracy they swear to uphold by hindering citizens’ abilities to make independent and fully informed decisions.²⁷⁵ Although he limits his discussion to American journalism, he raises an interesting question regarding journalistic practices “in the service of democracy.”²⁷⁶

The concept that media have the “social responsibility” of providing readers with “all the facts” of a given situation in an objectively truthful way so that they may make informed decisions about issues is what cultural media historians like Carey would likely

D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 615-617.

²⁷³ Jim A. Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 16, 202.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁷⁶ This refers back to the alteration of *La Vanguardia*'s masthead to include “al servicio de la democracia” in September of 1936. See Chapter 2.

call today's "idea of the report" in democratic societies. As Park indicated as early as 1923, "the press, as it exists, is not, as our moralists sometimes seem to assume, the willful product of any little group of living men...The natural history of the press...is an account of the conditions under which the existing newspaper has grown up and taken form."²⁷⁷ The "idea of the report," having changed significantly over time and space, consequently influences the framing processes evident in the particular newspapers of particular eras.

When speculating as to what role the media should play in democratic countries such as the United States, many scholars and theorists have discussed the issues of tone, content, and general standards but, in reality, the debate goes much deeper than people realize. As Hart explains: "A basic question is whether or not the news should have a voice of its own. If the news is a mere conduit, after all, a neutral medium that passes along the nation's dialogue, its texts should be self-denying...The reporter would be little more than a scribe."²⁷⁸ Should democratic newspapers express opinions or stick merely to "the facts"? What characterizes propaganda and should they be allowed to use it? What types of circumstances, if any, render it acceptable to lie to readers concerning important events in world affairs? Does the reporting of those events necessitate interpretation? Can a free press successfully battle totalitarianism in times of crisis, or does its liberty of opinion and subsequent "disunity" place it at a unique disadvantage?

According to Hart, "the press assumes...that facts are inchoate, inexpressible on

²⁷⁷ Robert E. Park, "The Natural History of the Newspaper," *American Journal of Sociology* 29.3 (November 1923): 273-274.

²⁷⁸ R. P. Hart, *Campaign Talk: Why Elections Are Good for Us* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 170-171.

their own terms; that politics dies unless dramatized; and that traditional news norms ensure an enlightened polity.”²⁷⁹ If this is the case, then *La Vanguardia* may have subscribed to the view that without the dramatization of events—the exaggeration of military triumphs, the sentimental speeches praising the Republic, the fierce condemnation of fascist troops and their leaders, the romanticization of the Catalan proletariat—they could not sustain the active Republican Resistance for which Barcelona is now famously remembered in a city which became increasingly vulnerable and unstable with each passing day. Kate Adie, chief news correspondent for *BBC News*, once posed the famous question: “When does a reporter sacrifice the principle of the whole truth to the need to win the war?” The truth, however, cannot be so simple, as the news tends to be more manifold than critics care to admit: “The news is a complex thing. In reality, it is not one thing but many things. It is both herald and critic, soothsayer and cultural historian, and its text contains a congeries of voices.”²⁸⁰ It is precisely this “congeries of voices” captured by contemporary media that provides insight into those political discourses of the past.

During the Spanish Civil War, *La Vanguardia* was confronted with a singular battle: that of communicating resistance in a losing cause. More likely than not, reporters and readers alike understood by late 1938 that the resistance was a matter of valiantly postponing the inevitable, for as the Republic weakened, Franco’s forces grew in strength and number. One element *La Vanguardia* did not misrepresent, however, was Barcelona’s

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 172.

²⁸⁰ Kate Adie, “Dispatches from the Front: Reporting War,” *Contemporary Issues in British Journalism* (Vauxhall Lectures, Centre for Journalism Studies: Cardiff University, 1998), 169

status as a critical fortress city of the Republic. Its loss preceded by just two months the end of the war.²⁸¹ Barcelona had put up such a powerful defense, in fact, that Franco punished Catalonia by leaving the devastated capital in rubble for over a decade. For the next thirty-six years, Catalonians would be forced to suppress any manifestation of pride in their culture, language, or heritage, a factor likely stimulating the secession movement taking place today (a cause the newspaper presently supports).

La Vanguardia may have failed along with the Second Spanish Republic it so ardently defended, but its wartime editions survive as a profound testament to the struggle for Spanish democracy and the media discourses that framed it. The master frames and their respective themes emerged early on and intensified as the war progressed, often to the point of incredulity as the sense of impending doom began to seep in. As discussed at length in this thesis, the frames constructed by *La Vanguardia* were not entirely truthful. They distorted events to give the appearance of a more favorable outcome to the war. Above all, its message remained “we cannot lose the war” because the consequences would be too devastating to fathom.²⁸² *La Vanguardia*’s Republican publications represented the long-suppressed voice of a “New Spain” not to be overshadowed by the oppressive and imperialist past that Franco sought to resurrect.

According to Foucault, “one cannot speak of anything at any time; it is not easy to say something new” as the “conditions required for the appearance of an object of

²⁸¹ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 377-379, 396-397.

²⁸² *La Vanguardia*, January 25, 1939.

discourse...are many and imposing.”²⁸³ For the first time in Spain’s history, liberal newspapers found themselves in a position of power in which they were permitted to voice the progressive ideals that drove them. When Franco and his forces rose up against the new authority in the name of “tradition,” Republican media were reluctant to relinquish their newfound liberty of coverage, thought, and even dissent. Instead, newspapers like *La Vanguardia* and their sympathizers resisted the shift backward, causing a “sudden irruption” in the “infinite continuity of discourse.”²⁸⁴

Like Benford and Snow, this thesis views “*ideology as a cultural resource* for framing activity.”²⁸⁵ It should be noted that ideology remains distinct from framing, but the two are undoubtedly linked, as framing processes are shaped by the ideological constraints in which they take place. As Westby argues: “Framing is thereby formulated as a jointly constituted process, as discourse that conjoins the ideological and the strategic.”²⁸⁶ Interestingly, however, this perspective on framing “has not inspired much theoretical attention” despite its potential to illuminate the cultural history of democratic traditions of journalism.²⁸⁷ My research contributes to this understudied approach to news framing

²⁸³ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 44.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁸⁵ David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Clarifying the Relationship Between Framing and Ideology,” *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, Ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 209.

²⁸⁶ David L. Westby, “Strategic Imperative, Ideology, and Frames,” *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, Ed. Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 220.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 220-221.

analysis in applying it to the frames inspired by a radical irruption in Spanish history. In so doing, this study explores the profound interaction between media framing and the ideological shifts that affect political communication.

My objective in this thesis has been to highlight those frames present in the news coverage of Catalonia's capital newspaper during the final year of the Spanish Civil War, to analyze what they suggested about the Republican political discourse of the era, and to explain the social and environmental factors that appeared to influence their emergence and development. To echo Sloan and Stamm: "Our questions cannot be limited to the press alone, for the press exists in society...The fact of interaction between media and society has to be one of the fundamentals of communication history."²⁸⁸ Because historical periodicals offer a kind of snapshot into the past, frames serve as a useful tool in the identification of the ideological shifts that have marked world history and shaped contemporary institutions.

In *La Vanguardia*'s wartime framing, the battle for Spain emerged not solely as a battle for liberty and democracy, but for the progress of world culture and civilization. In 1938 the majority of Western democracies were still in their infancy and struggling to grow and stabilize in the aftermath of a world war and world depression that threatened to topple Europeans right back into the monarchical structures that had led them to the brink of devastation in the first place. While Canada, Great Britain, and the United States boasted strong democracies, they appeared to falter before their more aggressive adversaries, leading some to question their effectiveness. Spanish democracy challenged the authority

²⁸⁸ David Sloan and Michael Stamm, *Historical methods in Communication, Third Edition* (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 19, 22.

of Spain's most established institutions: the monarchy, the Catholic Church, and the military. The Second Spanish Republic did not just grasp this radical break with the past, it celebrated it. Republicans proclaimed the dream of a "New Spain" that was egalitarian, secular, and fair. Their enemies, meanwhile, fought to maintain "tradition" and the "status quo" and to roll back the liberal efforts that made democracy possible. Foucault argues that "tradition enables us to isolate the new against a background of permanence, and to transfer its merit to originality, to genius, to the decisions proper to individuals."²⁸⁹ In this way, *La Vanguardia* effectively positioned Barcelona at the center of the Spanish Republican political discourse. It cultivated the image of a unified city racing toward victory. As Foucault's theory would argue, then, the political discourse captured in these frames simplified the war into a battle being fought out between two forces and two ideologies: the Germans and the Italians against the Spanish, the old against the new.

In actuality, Barcelona stood at the center of Republican disorder and chaos. Riots and demonstrations erupted on a regular basis, mobs and vandalism were rampant, and an atmosphere of suspicion overwhelmed the city to the point that citizens desperately feared denouncement by their own neighbors. Even those foreigners who fought so valiantly for the Republic would return from the front only to be arrested by rival factions. Radical socialists challenged less radical socialists, socialists challenged anarchists, and anarchists challenged liberals and progressives, so that Barcelona quickly gained a reputation of anarchy and unrest. Such events periodically disrupted operations in Barcelona, leading to the infamous "May Days" or "May Events" of 1937, during which Republican factions

²⁸⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 21.

viciously battled one another in the streets for control of the local government.²⁹⁰

La Vanguardia, in line with its prized Republic, framed a persuasive yet ineffectual appeal to western democracies. Its message was simple: The Spanish Civil War was not a civil war but the beginning of World War II. Spain, after centuries of oppression, sought to emulate the democratic systems of Great Britain and the United States. This, it argued, should make Spain a welcome friend to support and protect, but instead Spaniards found themselves neglected and ignored. The newspaper posed many of the same questions as the Brigaders: why did British and American leaders appear to favor their enemies when it was so clearly against their better interests? How could they fail to recognize the strategic importance of Spain in the European theatre? After all, it was evident from the outset that it was only a matter of time before the fascist attitudes embodied by Hitler and Mussolini directly threatened the democratic regimes of France and England. Although the Non-Intervention Pact showed no indication of ever being lifted, *La Vanguardia* continued to plead for international assistance and presented to readers the impression that, despite their apparent reluctance, the allies would eventually come to Spain's defense.

The final year of the Spanish Civil War marked the death of an era. Even the liberal values so prized by the Republic came under siege as the conflict intensified. The great revolutionary city of Barcelona succumbed to fear, desperation, and corruption as prospects became increasingly bleak. As Orwell famously observed, "The fact is that every war suffers a kind of progressive degradation with every month that it continues, because such things as individual liberty and a truthful press are simply not compatible with military

²⁹⁰ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 263-273; Christopher Ealham, "Anarchism and Illegality in Barcelona, 1931-7," *Contemporary European History* 4(2) (1995): 133-151.

efficiency.”²⁹¹ Telling the “truth” under such circumstances would have been a challenging task, as not only did the truth contradict its vision of a free and progressive Spanish society, but it also disrupted the international “face” it sought to project to outsiders as upstanding, strong, and unified. It appears, then, that *La Vanguardia*’s “idea of the report” in 1938 was the magnification of a beam of hope meant to ignite the spark of resistance and to inspire endurance in the darkest of times. *La Vanguardia* evidently intended to motivate collective opposition to fascism in the face of defeat in order to keep alive the revolutionary spirit that had transformed Barcelona over the previous decade. In this respect, one could argue, *La Vanguardia* may have succeeded, as Spain stunned the world with its peaceful transition to democracy in 1975.

La Vanguardia diagnosed the Spanish Civil War as a battle for democracy, liberty and justice. It stated that an armed defense was the only means by which to protect those values. It sought to galvanize collective action by constantly reminding readers of the terrifying consequences of a Republican collapse. What makes *La Vanguardia*’s coverage in 1938 so fascinating is that it emboldened these collective action frames as Franco’s victory became inevitable, apparently *in response* to this development. Why it did so remains unclear, but it appears that the newspaper spoke to multiple audiences: Catalonians, foreign sympathizers, and most interestingly, future generations. The frames crafted by *La Vanguardia* reveal a telling aspect of the Republican political discourse, that of complete faith in a revolutionary future for a people still to come. *La Vanguardia* evidently recognized, in the same vein as Unamuno, that the liberal ideals that had taken root in Spain would eventually resurge to reclaim its legacy. Orwell and his contemporaries

²⁹¹ George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 1952), 180.

may have lamented the bitter end of Spanish democracy in 1939 and the subsequent lies to be aired in the wake of a fascist takeover, yet international scholarship has ultimately favored the Spanish Left. Contrary, then, to Orwell's assertion that "the winners write history," the Spanish Civil War proves that some narratives are defined by the "losers."²⁹² Indeed, the case of *La Vanguardia* suggests that the historical record is determined by more than just military victories.

It has already been demonstrated that wartime journalism is evaluated according to different criteria than other journalistic forms: it enjoys an elevated status and is allowed greater liberties in the open expression of opinion, emotion, and bias on behalf of the reporter. One is led to consider, then, that the frames constructed in wartime to motivate collective action might also be evaluated differently. To this effect, I propose that this type of framing analysis should also be applied to the coverage of an equally prominent Madrid-based newspaper, such as *ABC*, in the same years (1936-1939) so that I might investigate this further. Such a study would prove useful in identifying the trends and patterns of Spain's resistance to fascism, thereby contributing a more comprehensive understanding of the ideologies communicated by Spanish Republican media.

²⁹² Ruth MacKay, "The Good Fight and Good History: The Spanish Civil War," *History Workshop Journal* 70 (2010): 199.

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